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Criminal procedure has long set a boundary between public and private in
criminal enforcement: generally speaking, enforcement decisions at the post-charging
stage are exposed to some degree of public view, while those at the pre-charging stage
remain almost entirely secret. The allocation of public and private is, at heart, an
allocation of power—and the current allocation is a relic. When private prosecutors
were the mainstay of criminal enforcement, public court processes effectively constrained
them. But those processes do little to constrain the spaces where enforcement power
today resides: in decisions by the servants of a state-run, professionalized enforcement
apparatus on whether to investigate, to charge, or to decline charges.
This Article challenges criminal procedure’s centuries-old boundary between
public and private in criminal enforcement. It argues that the justifications for the
boundary are outdated and overstated, and the costs undernoticed. The public-private
boundary has served to skew enforcers’ incentives, impoverish insight into enforcement
patterns and their causes, weaken traditional channels of accountability (judicial,
electoral, and internal), and erode public trust. The Article reimagines a new
boundary for our time, one that strengthens secrecy in some respects while relaxing it
in others, and enables robust oversight of necessarily secret processes. More
fundamentally, the Article is a call to center the public-private boundary in accounts of
power in the criminal process.
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INTRODUCTION
Some prosecutorial decisions are subject to public scrutiny, while
others are shielded from it. Criminal procedure sets the boundary
between the two. This Article is about the relationship between that
boundary and the allocation of institutional power in the criminal
process.
Criminal procedure serves a variety of functions, among them
distributing power between enforcers and targets.1 The procedures
1 See Issachar Rosen-Zvi & Talia Fisher, Overcoming Procedural Boundaries, 94 VA. L.
REV. 79, 88, 135 (2008) (discussing key functions of criminal procedure, among them errorreduction, legitimatization of the penal sanction, and balancing power as between the
prosecution and defense).
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that collectively delineate public from private in the criminal process2
draw a boundary between the pre- and post-charging stages: generally
speaking, enforcement at the pre-charging stage unfolds in secret,
while that at the post-charging stage takes place in view of the public
or, at a minimum, defense attorneys and courts. In place since the
Founding, when enforcement power was mostly wielded by victims and
community members, this boundary once served to constrain
enforcement overreach. But changes to the structures and institutions
of American criminal enforcement over the last two centuries have
inverted that function. Today, criminal procedure’s boundary between public and private aggrandizes enforcement power rather than
constraining it.
The development has been both insidious and influential—
garnering relatively little attention even as it has fundamentally
redistributed power within the criminal process. This is because both
participants in and observers of that process have fallen back on
historical justifications for the public-private boundary, even as
institutional changes have rendered those justifications largely
obsolete. Pre-charging secrecy rules and norms are said to ensure
investigative integrity and protect against unfounded accusations,3
while post-charging publicity rights are celebrated as bulwarks against
enforcement abuse.4 But in today’s enforcement ecosystem, this
arrangement has it backwards.
Transparency in the post-charging stage constrains only the last,
and arguably least consequential, of a series of enforcement actions.
The more impactful earlier actions—decisions on whether to
investigate, whom to target, and whether and what crimes to charge—
are made in secret, free from the gaze of defense attorneys, judges, and

2 By “procedures” I refer broadly to the mix of law (constitutional, statutory, and
judge-made) and customary practices and norms that guide the criminal process. See Mona
Lynch, The Situated Actor and the Production of Punishment: Toward an Empirical Social
Psychology of Criminal Procedure, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING 199, 208 (Sharon
Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017).
3 See infra notes 57–58 and accompanying text (on grand jury secrecy); infra note
104–05 and accompanying text (on secrecy of declination decisions).
4 See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948) (“Whatever other benefits the guarantee
to an accused that his trial be conducted in public may confer upon our society, the
guarantee has always been recognized as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our
courts as instruments of persecution.”); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 47 (1984)
(extending Sixth Amendment right to guarantee public suppression hearings, noting
“[t]he public in general also has a strong interest in exposing substantial allegations of
police misconduct to the salutary effects of public scrutiny”). See generally Jocelyn
Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2173 (2014)
(tracing constraint of enforcement abuse theory in the Court’s public trial right cases,
arguing right should extend to plea hearings).
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the public.5 What’s more, enforcers’ near-exclusive control over the
extent of secrecy in those earlier stages serves to protect them from
public accounting more than it protects from investigative or
reputational harms.6 And the mechanisms that do exist to hold
enforcers accountable—judicial, electoral, even internal—are handicapped by obscured visibility: public outcomes (charges filed,
convictions obtained, sentences imposed) are not useful indicators in
isolation from the private actions that preceded them.
This Article exposes the allocation of public and private in the
criminal process as an allocation of power—and challenges it. The
Article excavates the history behind the current public-private
boundary, demonstrating how it once served to constrain enforcement
power. It reveals criminal procedure’s failure to adapt to changes in
the enforcement power structure, demonstrating how the procedures
delineating public and private no longer do the work courts, scholars,
and policymakers have largely assumed them to do. It exposes the
substantial yet largely unappreciated costs of this failure. Finally, the
Article argues for a realignment of the boundary, one that manages
the particular risks and harms of enforcement power in our time.
Unsettling assumptions about the current allocation of public and
private in criminal enforcement is an urgent project. New technologies are enabling greater public visibility into previously shrouded
aspects of the criminal process.7 New record-keeping laws8 and

5 Magistrates oversee the issuance of individual search warrants, but have no
continuing supervision over an investigation. Their role is also perfunctory, evaluating
affidavits for probable cause with no consideration of broader questions, and seeing only
the subset of facts prosecutors or police deem necessary to disclose for purpose of
demonstrating probable cause. Defense attorneys may sometimes play a role at the precharging stage, but they have little power or control over the case at that point: they cannot
file motions or subpoena evidence; do not have an assigned judge to whom they can direct
requests or complaints; and have no ability to assess the strength of evidence, the
prosecution’s theory of the case, or the potential crimes prosecutors are considering unless
prosecutors chose, in their discretion, to provide such information.
6 See infra sub-subsection II.A.1.b and II.A.2.b.
7 See David Yokum, Anita Ravishankar & Alexander Coppock, A Randomized Control
Trial Evaluating the Effects of Police Body-Worn Cameras, 116 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCIS. 10329
(2019) (police-worn body cameras); Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 391
(2016) (citizen cellphone video recording of police-citizen encounters).
8 See Al Baker & Emily Vasquez, Number of People Stopped by New York Police Soars, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 3, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/03/nyregion/03frisk.html
[https://perma.cc/52DT-APXS] (recounting passage of New York City Council Law in
2001 that mandated NYPD disclosure of citizen stops, and subsequent legal action by City
Council and civil liberties groups to ensure NYPD compliance). The disclosures made
pursuant to the 2001 Police Reporting Law ultimately paved the way for the class action in
Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). See Daniel Denvir, The Key
Ingredient in Stop-and-Frisk Reform: Open Data, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Aug. 24, 2015),

2022]

PROSECUTION IN PUBLIC, PROSECUTION IN PRIVATE

1075

voluntary data initiatives9 in some jurisdictions have enabled previously
shrouded practices to come to light. Recent civil rights investigations
by the federal government10 along with civil rights claims by private
parties,11 have exposed unconstitutional or at least undesirable targeting and declination practices in some jurisdictions. And recent
scholarship has revealed the effects of early-stage enforcement
decisions on incarceration and other forms of penal control—both in
terms of scope (how many people) and demographics (which people).12
Yet scholarship on secrecy and transparency in criminal
procedure remains largely focused on the post-charging stage, with
much of the critique leveled at the relatively secretive plea-bargaining
process.13 While convictions resulting from plea bargaining are more
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2015/08/the-missing-ingredient-in-stop-and-friskaccountability-open-data/402026/ [https://perma.cc/6N6B-UM4A].
9 See Miller & Wright, infra note 14 (analyzing declination decisions voluntarily kept
and published by New Orleans District Attorney Harry Connick, as well as summary data
kept by prosecutors voluntarily participating in a reporting project with Vera Institute);
BESIKI LUKA KUTATELADZE & NANCY R. ANDILORO, PROSECUTION AND RACIAL JUSTICE IN
NEW YORK COUNTY—TECHNICAL REPORT (2014), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij
/grants/247227.pdf [https://perma.cc/DR9U-BXGE] (analysis of racial disparities at
charging and post-charging stages, based on data provided by the Manhattan District
Attorney’s Office).
See also PROSECUTORIAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS, https://
prosecutorialperformanceindicators.org
[https://perma.cc/2QZ9-9ZM3],
a
data
collection partnership between academic institutions and six prosecutors’ offices, which
collects data on various metrics, including some charging and declination data at a general
(non-offense specific) level.
10 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T JUST. C.R. DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT
(2015),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases
/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc
/YMZ4-K3FU]; Memorandum of Understanding Between the Montana Attorney General,
the Missoula County Attorney’s Office, Missoula County, and the United States Department
of Justice (June 10, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/06
/10/missoula_settle_6-10-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3SH-SPCA].
11 See David Rudovsky, Opening Statement, Stop-and-Frisk: The Power of Data and the
Decision in Floyd v. City of New York, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 117 (2013) (discussing class
action lawsuits in New York City and Philadelphia raising constitutional challenges to the
cities’ stop-and-frisk practices); Alison Siegler & William Admussen, Discovering Racial
Discrimination by the Police, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 987 (2021) (discussing discovery of targeting
and selection practices uncovered by recent selective enforcement allegations against
federal law enforcement agencies).
12 See ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL
CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2018); JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE
TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017).
13 See, e.g., Kay L. Levine, Ronald F. Wright, Nancy J. King & Marc L. Miller, Sharkfests
and Databases: Crowdsourcing Plea Bargains, 6 TEX. A&M L. REV. 653 (2019); Simonson, supra
note 4; Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Notice-and-Comment Sentencing, 97 MINN.
L. REV. 1 (2012); Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 911 (2006). Some critique has focused more specifically on the lack of
transparency of the prosecutor’s case file at the adjudicative stage. See Ben Grunwald, The
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opaque than those resulting from trial, they are nevertheless visible
and publicly documented, the product of negotiation by adversaries
and at least some form of judicial review. This is not to describe plea
bargains as transparent, adversaries as equals, or the judicial role as
significant, but rather to highlight the relative transparency and
accountability generated by the plea-bargaining process as compared
to that which preceded it: the decision to investigate a person; to arrest
him; to charge him, and with what crimes. The relatively greater
secrecy at those earlier decision points is also more concerning. While
the partial opacity of plea bargaining surely influences case outcomes,
it is early-stage enforcement decisions that set the parameters of the
bargain. And near complete secrecy in those early-stage decisions
impedes defense attorneys, judges, and the public from understanding
how and why those parameters came to be.
The limited scholarship on transparency at the pre-charging stage
has largely focused on the generation of rules and policies to govern
the exercise of discretion, and which institutional actors are best suited
to create and enforce them.14 While important, these projects have
bypassed a foundational issue, namely, that secrecy in early-stage
enforcement decisions is itself a policy choice—one that profoundly
influences enforcement while impeding attempts to understand and
improve it. And while some reformers have recently acknowledged
this,15 enacted policy changes have largely focused on improving
disclosures of post-charging data,16 with little attention to the precharging stage or to the particular categories of disclosures that will

Fragile Promise of Open-File Discovery, 49 CONN. L. REV. 771 (2017) (reviewing the literature
and offering empirical-based challenge to the critique).
14 See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1827 (2015); John Rappaport, Second-Order Regulation of Law Enforcement, 103 CALIF. L.
REV. 205 (2015); Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125
(2008). One exception is Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional
Awareness in Criminal Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049 (2016), which focuses on how courts
can and should use aggregate information about arrests, searches, and other law
enforcement action to enhance judicial oversight. However, courts’ information on precharging decisions is limited to the few that require judicial review—that is, warranted
searches and arrests leading to a criminal charge. Warrantless searches are effectively
exempt from judicial oversight unless subsequently challenged, and the vast majority of
arrests do not result in criminal charges.
15 See Sarah Lustbader, A New Wave of Prosecutorial Transparency, APPEAL (June 7,
2019),
https://theappeal.org/spotlight-a-new-wave-of-prosecutorial-transparency/
[https://perma.cc/RLD5-TM3Q] (discussing efforts by elected prosecutors in New York
City, San Francisco, and Chicago, and a recently enacted law in Connecticut, all aimed at
increasing public access to prosecutorial data).
16 Id. These efforts mostly expand disclosures of details on charged cases; the few
disclosures of declinations implemented thus far have been too generalized for meaningful
analysis.
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generate the greatest benefits to accountability relative to their costs.
These oversights matter, because as recent work in behavioral
economics and public administration has shown, “transparency” is
neither a monolith nor a panacea: some forms of transparency may
impede rather than enhance accountability,17 while others may simply
prove ineffectual.18 In short, it is high time to treat where we draw the
boundary between secrecy and transparency as a policy choice, one
with a complicated set of costs and benefits—and to consider whether
the current mapping pays its way.
This Article shows that it does not. Study of the pivotal secret
aspects of the criminal process—the decision to target, the decision to
decline charges, and the presentation of evidence to the grand jury—
reveals two harmful and underappreciated power dynamics. One is
the inequitable distribution of secrecy’s dividends. Police and
prosecutors can and do utilize secrecy selectively to their benefit, while
other intended beneficiaries (targets and subjects) generally cannot.
The second is aggregate effects. Though secrecy is designed to protect
individual cases and investigations, it collectively prevents insight into
patterns of early-stage enforcement decisions across time, location,
case type, and demographic group.
An analysis of transparency—or, more accurately, partial
transparency—in the criminal process likewise reveals two important
effects on enforcement oversight and, by extension, enforcement
power and discretion. First, partial transparency impedes observers’
ability to detect the causes of visible (i.e., end-stage) enforcement
patterns. Researchers, for instance, routinely use public sentencing
data to draw causal inferences about sentencing disparities,19 even
though that data is an artifact of earlier, nonpublic decisions about
arrests and charging.20 Second, partial transparency incentivizes
enforcers to maximize disclosed end-stage outputs (arrests,
convictions, and imposed penalties) and so steers earlier-stage

17 See Jacob E. Gersen & Matthew C. Stephenson, Over-Accountability, 6 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 185 (2014); Amitai Etzioni, The Limits of Transparency, 74 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 687
(2014); Andrea Prat, The Wrong Kind of Transparency, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 862 (2005). See
generally infra Section III.A.
18 See Yokum et al., supra note 7. See generally infra Section III.A.
19 See, e.g., U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED
STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING (2012).
20 See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity:
Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2, 35–36 (2013)
(assessing the causes of racial disparities in federal sentences by linking sentencing data to
charging data, but cautioning that racial disparities in offenses charged may reflect
disparities in earlier decisions of whether to arrest and charge—data unavailable to
researchers).
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decisions to that end.21 And what few efforts exist to assess early-stage
enforcement practices are hampered by reliance on law enforcement’s
self-reporting, making it difficult for overseers to assess whether data
reflects actual practice or inaccurate reporting of it.22
The boundary between public and private in criminal procedure
has shaped not only the exercise of enforcement power and discretion,
but also public perceptions of it. One way is obvious: enforcers’ control
over the dissemination of information on early-stage decisionmaking
allows them to control the enforcement narrative. Another is less
obvious, and perhaps more pernicious. The lack of broad public
visibility into the vast majority of early-stage enforcement decisions,
combined with limited visibility into an isolated slice of them, fuels
speculation and slowly corrodes public trust.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I places criminal procedure’s
treatment of secrecy and transparency in historical perspective. It
traces the origins of the public-private boundary, its erstwhile role in
cultivating prosecutorial constraint, and the institutional shifts that
have untethered it from that function. Part II elaborates on this
dynamic, showing how the current boundaries between public and
private enable and perpetuate the very power imbalances they once
functioned to constrain. Part III imagines a different allocation of
public and private in prosecution, one that more intentionally and
thoughtfully balances protection of investigations, innocence
presumption, and reputational harm with the imperatives of public
knowledge and meaningful oversight.
It argues, somewhat
counterintuitively, not for less secrecy across the board, but instead for
more targeted secrecy: greater in some respects, and less in others.
Finally, it envisions ways to generate meaningful public oversight of
early-stage enforcement decisions within necessary secrecy constraints.
Behind criminal procedure’s “[g]atehouses and [m]ansions” (in
Yale Kamisar’s famed analogy to police stations and courts),23 are its
back rooms—the spaces where police and prosecutors determine who
enters the gatehouse and mansion in the first place, and under what
terms. In the middle of the last century, courts augmented criminal
procedure at the gatehouse. Today, legislators and regulators must
bring it to the back room.
21 See infra subsection II.B.2.
22 See Ninth Report of the Independent Monitor at 1, Floyd v. City of New York, 959
F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08-cv-01034) (discussing police department’s underreporting of stops and pro-forma supervisory review of stops, as revealed by periodic audits);
see also infra note 180 and accompanying text.
23 Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal
Procedure: From Powell to Gideon, from Escobedo to . . . , in YALE KAMISAR, FRED E. INBAU &
THURMAN ARNOLD, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME (1965).
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EVOLUTION AND STASIS

Criminal law and enforcement have evolved substantially since the
Founding; criminal procedure’s allocation of secrecy and transparency
has not. This Part charts this comparative evolution and stasis. It
demonstrates how the public-private boundary worked effectively to
curb the risks and dangers of victim and community-led criminal
enforcement, but did not adapt to the new risks and dangers that arose
from the shift to professionalized enforcement and the expansion of
regulatory crimes.
Of course, neither criminal enforcement nor criminal procedure
is a monolith: then, as now, there was much variation across
jurisdictions in the sorts of crimes prosecuted and the means and
manner of prosecution. But some practices and procedures were
broadly applicable. This Part focuses on those, and specifically on how
the public or private nature of those procedures allocated power as
between enforcers and targets.
A. Private Prosecutors, Public Investigations
At the Founding and for at least a half-century following, criminal
enforcement was primarily victim generated.24
While public
prosecutors existed in some jurisdictions, they played a minimal role.25
Victims, their kin, or community members (in the case of public order
or morals offenses) filed complaints, arrested criminals, and
prosecuted cases, occasionally with the aid of a constable or watchman
to perform the arrest or private counsel to bring the case.26
24 Allen Steinberg, From Private Prosecution to Plea Bargaining: Criminal Prosecution, the
District Attorney, and American Legal History, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 568, 569–70 (1984)
(describing the dominance of the private prosecutor until at least the middle of the
nineteenth century, noting that references to the power and discretion of the public
prosecutor first began to appear in state constitutions in the 1850s, and in judicial opinions
in the 1880s).
25 Id. at 572 (describing dominance of private prosecution even in colonies and states
with public prosecutors); see Abraham S. Goldstein, History of the Public Prosecutor, in 3
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1286, 1286–88 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983).
26 See DAVID J. BODENHAMER, FAIR TRIAL: RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 63 (1992); MIKE MCCONVILLE & CHESTER L. MIRSKY, JURY TRIALS AND PLEA
BARGAINING: A TRUE HISTORY 28 (2005) (“[T]he mainspring of the criminal justice system
in the first half of nineteenth century New York was the private prosecutor. It was the private
prosecutor—the victim or someone acting on his or her behalf—who initiated the
overwhelming majority of complaints and in whose name complaints were launched.”);
ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA, 1800–1880,
at 38 (1989) (“During the first half of the nineteenth century, private prosecution
dominated criminal justice in Philadelphia.”); id. at 55 (even in 1874, “the system
continued to be characterized by individuals asserting their rights”); William E. Nelson,
Emerging Notions of Modern Criminal Law in the Revolutionary Era: An Historical Perspective, 42
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This meant that citizens primarily investigated cases and saw them
through. These private prosecutors gathered evidence and readied
witnesses; initiated charges before a local official (typically a justice of
the peace or an alderman); and, if the official allowed the case to go
forward, presented evidence before the grand jury and sought from it
a true bill.27 The constables or night watchmen who occasionally aided
victims in the investigation—whether by executing search warrants,
locating and questioning witnesses, or making arrests—did so largely
at the victim’s direction.28
Criminal procedure meaningfully constrained enforcement
power and discretion. Justices of the peace, alderman or magistrates
evaluated victims’ initial allegations and determined whether to move
them forward to a grand jury. Grand juries, in turn, evaluated the
evidence brought forward by complainants, and determined whether
the conduct alleged merited criminal prosecution and, if so, whether
the evidence established probable cause to indict. Trial juries and trial
judges then assessed, upon hearing the evidence, whether the
defendant should be found guilty and, if so, the sentence warranted.
Across jurisdictions, one or more of these stages of review was
robust, and with good reason. Private prosecution carried the very real
risk of abuse: complainants frequently availed themselves of the
criminal process to sort out personal grievances or seek negotiating
leverage.29 To guard against such abuse, lower-level judicial officers
N.Y.U. L. REV. 450, 468 (1967) (offenses against property and against morals accounted for
nearly eighty percent of all criminal prosecutions in Revolutionary Middlesex,
Massachusetts, the former of which were prosecuted by victims and the latter by community
members); Sam Bass Warner, Investigating the Law of Arrest, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
111, 111–12 (1940) (describing use of the “hue and cry” in eighteenth and early nineteenth
century Britain and America, in which crime victims and their neighbors were responsible
for investigating crime and locating and arresting suspects).
27 See MICHAEL STEPHEN HINDUS, PRISON AND PLANTATION: CRIME, JUSTICE, AND
AUTHORITY IN MASSACHUSETTS AND SOUTH CAROLINA, 1767–1878, at 96 (1980) (South
Carolina in the early- to mid-nineteenth century); MCCONVILLE & MIRSKY, supra note 26, at
47–48 (New York in the early nineteenth century); ROGER LANE, POLICING THE CITY:
BOSTON 1822–1885, at 7–9 (1967) (Boston in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries); see also William F. McDonald, Towards a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal Justice:
The Return of the Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649, 651–52 (1976) (describing the victimdominated criminal justice systems in the American colonies).
28 See MCCONVILLE & MIRSKY, supra note 26, at 59–71.
29 See STEINBERG, supra note 26, at 49 (“Because the criminal law was so accessible and
pliable, it was often used to influence the outcome of a private squabble. Any pair of citizens
in a relationship that was potentially antagonistic might resort to the criminal law should
the antagonism materialize.”); id. at 46 (“Defendants likewise sought to control the
[criminal] process, and the best way for them to do so was to become prosecutors
themselves. They did this by instituting cross-bills, in which an accused person retaliated by
pressing the same charge against the original prosecutor.”); HINDUS, supra note 27, at 86
(observing that in antebellum South Carolina “the criminal justice system was a malleable
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would resolve complaints summarily,30 grand juries might regularly
refuse to return indictments,31 or trial juries regularly acquitted.32
These reviews were also (with the exception of grand jury
deliberations) transparent. Transparency was presumed to operate as
an effective constraint on unreasonable or arbitrary exercises of state
power,33 and early American criminal justice systems wielded it to that
end. Charging decisions were announced before large public
audiences. In colonial Virginia, for instance, grand jury indictments
were returned in a courtroom overflowing with spectators, who
listened as names of those charged, and the charges levied, were read
aloud.34 In early nineteenth-century Philadelphia, the magistrate's
office where victims brought initial criminal complaints was, in Allen
Steinberg's recounting, overflowing with spectators, “a grand, free
popular theatre, with friends and neighbors as the performers.”35 And
of course, criminal trials—then the mainstay of the adjudicative
adjunct to the other, traditional forms of authority that felt free to manipulate the legal
system for personal ends”); THEODORE FERDINAND, BOSTON’S LOWER CRIMINAL COURTS,
1814–1850, at 49–51 (1992) (observing that between 1814 and 1850, about half of all
criminal cases in Boston were essentially private disputes).
30 See STEINBERG, supra note 26, at 52 (describing this common practice in
Philadelphia); see also HINDUS, supra note 27, at 89 (observing that for much of the
nineteenth century, the “vast majority” of criminal cases in Massachusetts, all but the most
serious, were dispatched summarily by lower-level judicial officers).
31 See STEINBERG, supra note 26, at 57, 63 (Philadelphia); HINDUS, supra note 27, at 97
(noting that in two-thirds of assault and battery cases presented before grand juries in
antebellum South Carolina, the grand jury refused to return a true bill).
32 STEINBERG, supra note 26, at 59 (“The most important and enduring effects of
private prosecution on the courts were a low conviction rate and a high proportion of cases
that never reached a verdict at all,” reporting an average conviction rate of twenty-two
percent in Philadelphia between 1820 and 1874); HINDUS, supra note 27, at 91–92
(reporting acquittal rate of nearly thirty percent in South Carolina); FERDINAND, supra note
29, at 50 tbl.2.2 (juries found defendants not guilty in nearly one-third of cases that went to
a trial in Boston between 1814 and 1850); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN & ROBERT V. PERCIVAL,
THE ROOTS OF JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA 1870–
1910, at 182 tbl.5.13 (1981) (between 1880 and 1910 in Alameda County, California, less
than forty percent of all jury trials resulted in guilty verdicts).
33 See WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 249–51 (1980)
(describing the importance ascribed by early Americans to governance in the public eye);
BODENHAMER, supra note 26, at 32 (noting the public jury trial right was “especially
important” to the Founding era-conception of liberty; “[t]he presence of jurors precluded
secret trials . . . . It was, quite simply, the best method available of assuring justice and
protecting liberty”); id. at 48 (noting that “[w]hat remained constant” from the
Revolutionary through the Antebellum era, and imbued all criminal procedural safeguards,
“was a desire to restrain governmental power”).
34 See A. G. Roeber, Authority, Law, and Custom: The Rituals of Court Day in Tidewater
Virginia, 1720 to 1750, 37 WM. & MARY Q. 29, 32, 45–46 (1980) (describing proceedings in
Virginia’s county courts as a “drama in which the entire county played a part”).
35 STEINBERG, supra note 26, at 17–18.
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process—were public, a feature deemed so critical to constraining state
abuses it was guaranteed in the Bill of Rights and the Constitution of
every state.36
In sum, the boundary between secrecy and transparency that had
developed in the colonies and was embraced at the Founding (through
both constitutional provisions and continued practices) effectively
constrained the criminal enforcement risks of the time. Those risks
were primarily of private abuse: victims or community members who
might utilize the criminal process to harass or profit, or as a
mechanism for settling private disputes. But those risks were soon to
recede, and new risks to arise, as criminal law and enforcement in the
United States underwent a sea change.
B. The Rise of Public Prosecutors and the Shifting of Enforcement Power
As the nineteenth century progressed, prosecution professionalized. Police forces proliferated, first in cities and then in smaller
towns.37 Public prosecutors gradually took over more and more of the
criminal docket, eventually staking their place as full-time, salaried
ministers of the criminal process.38 Criminal law changed around this
time, too: from a common law focused mostly on redressing harm to
individuals and securing communal norms, to a vast code regulating
all manner of public and private behavior.39 Prosecutors could choose
from a vast array of potential charges, but lacked the capacity or
inclination to pursue every potential code violation.40
These shifts gave rise to the exercise of professional enforcement
discretion. Where once judicial officials and grand juries had served
as the gatekeepers of the criminal process, now prosecutors served that
36 See BODENHAMER, supra note 26. Cesare Beccaria, an enlightenment philosopher
whose 1764 essay, On Crimes and Punishments, is widely considered a key influence on early
American criminal justice reform, wrote that public trials were necessary to “restrain power
and passions.” CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 22 (Henry Paolucci trans.,
Bobbs-Merrill Educ. Publ’g 1963) (1764). For a compelling illustration of the influence of
spectators in criminal trials around the Founding, see STEVEN WILF, LAW’S IMAGINED
REPUBLIC: POPULAR POLITICS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 37–38
(2010) (describing the influence of spectators at the 1770 trial of Ebenezer Richardson in
Boston).
37 See SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
49–69 (2d ed. 1998).
38 Id. at 69–71; BODENHAMER, supra note 26, at 68; NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST
THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940, at
255–94 (2013); see also Goldstein, supra note 25, at 1288.
39 See Lauren M. Ouziel, Beyond Law and Fact: Jury Evaluation of Law Enforcement, 92
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 691, 714–15 (2016) (discussing this transition, and its effects on
prosecutors and juries).
40 Id. at 719.
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role. Public prosecutors were expected to weed out those cases that,
in their professional view, lacked the requisite evidence to prevail at
trial, or concerned conduct that did not merit penal sanction.41 As
professional prosecutors rose, then, so did the stakes of charging
crimes. Complainants’ allegations had been viewed skeptically by the
public and the various gatekeepers of the process.42 In contrast, a
professional accusation of criminality carried weight and credibility.
The move from lay to professional prosecution thus precipitated
a shift in the locus of enforcement power—from courts, where juries (grand
and petit) or judges evaluated charges, determined guilt, and imposed
sentence, to prosecutors, who effectively alone determined whom and
what to charge. But the procedures designed to ensure the reasonable
exercise of that power did not shift accordingly. Magistrates continued
to evaluate complaints, and grand juries’ indictments, for probable
cause even as professional prosecutors ensured charging instruments
routinely satisfied that standard. Charging decisions continued to be
issued in open court, even as those courtrooms emptied of spectators.
The public trial right endured even as trials waned and adjudication
moved into the shadows of plea bargaining.
While these procedures remained necessary to a fair process,43
they were no longer sufficient. The rise of professional prosecution
coupled with the expansion of criminal codes vested the state with
enormous discretion—and, by extension, power—in charging.44 Yet
no additional procedures developed to constrain charging practices.
To the contrary, existing procedures remained stagnant or even
weakened.45 And while the rise of prosecutor elections in the mid- to
late nineteenth century was thought to impose political constraints on
public prosecutors,46 it was not accompanied by a shift of the publicprivate boundary to aid electoral oversight. The result, as the next Part
shows, is an outdated procedural framework that expands rather than
constrains criminal enforcement power.
41 Id.
42 See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text.
43 See Ouziel, supra note 39 (arguing that the criminal jury trial has evolved, and
appropriately so, to become a quasi-evaluation of law enforcement’s competence and
legitimacy in investigating and bringing a case).
44 See David Alan Sklansky, The Nature and Function of Prosecutorial Power, 106 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 473, 488–89 (2016) (“[T]he more discretion that prosecutors have, the
greater will be the concern, generally speaking, about the power they exercise and vice
versa.”).
45 For instance, jury nullification became disfavored, see Ouziel, supra note 39, at 723–
24, as did the use of grand juries to review charges, see infra notes 51–56 and accompanying
text.
46 See Michael J. Ellis, The Origins of the Elected Prosecutor, 121 YALE L.J. 1528, 1550–57
(2012).
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HOW THE CURRENT PUBLIC-PRIVATE BOUNDARY ENLARGES
CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT POWER

This Part considers how criminal procedure’s allocation of secrecy
and transparency protects and advances enforcement power. Section
A analyzes three key aspects of the criminal process that remain
shrouded in secrecy: grand jury proceedings, the decision to target,
and the decision to decline prosecution. It charts the development of
these secret processes in the context of changes in criminal
enforcement, and considers the ways in which they operate today to
protect and advance prosecutorial power and discretion.
Two key insights emerge. The first is asymmetry in secrecy’s
conferred dividends: police and prosecutors can and do utilize secrecy
selectively to their benefit, while secrecy’s primary intended beneficiaries cannot. The second is aggregate implications: though secrecy is
designed to protect individual cases and investigations, it collectively
prevents insight into patterns of early-stage enforcement decisions
across time, location, case type, and demographic group.
Section B considers transparency. First, it identifies the ways in
which partial transparency—the disclosure of selected data from the
criminal process—can deceive as to the sources and nature of
enforcement patterns. It then considers the ways in which transparency incentivizes the very behaviors it seeks to constrain. It concludes
with a discussion of how these two harms, deceptiveness and
misaligned incentives, perpetuate each other.
A. Secret Criminal Processes: Past and Present
This Section analyzes three pivotal aspects of the criminal process
hidden from public view: grand jury proceedings, the decision to
target, and the decision to decline prosecution. It compares the
historical and the contemporary, charting how the uses and purposes
of secrecy in these processes have evolved over time to aggrandize
enforcement power and minimize accountability.
1. Grand Jury Secrecy
a. Historical Development
Secrecy has attended the grand jury since its earliest use, both in
England and America.47 In colonial times, the grand jury was

47 See SARA SUN BEALE, WILLIAM C. BRYSON, TAYLOR H. CRABTREE, JAMES E. FELMAN,
MICHAEL J. ELSTON & KATHERINE EARLE YANES, GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.2 (2d
ed. 2020).
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considered a bulwark against British rule; grand jury secrecy helped
protect both evidence gathering and deliberation from royal
interference.48 Grand juries in the new republic continued to insulate
the fact-finding process from state interference.49 In addition to
independently assessing probable cause in criminal prosecutions, state
and local grand juries investigated government malfeasance, neglect,
and corruption. They issued not only indictments, but also reports
detailing evidence they uncovered, and recommendations for new laws
or other improvements.50 Secrecy was critical to all of these grand jury
functions: it ensured grand juries could, without state pressure, gather
evidence, engage in deliberations, and reach conclusions—even if the
upshot of that process challenged or undermined state governance.
In the nineteenth century, as criminal prosecution moved from
lay to professional hands and criminal law expanded in scope and
complexity, the grand jury came under attack. Beginning in England
and then in America, legal scholars and law reformers alike critiqued
the grand jury as a relic that gave outsized power to lay citizens.51 The
critiques were soon adopted by judges and lawmakers, and over the
course of several decades, a series of laws, constitutional amendments,
and judicial rulings placed limits on the grand jury’s power.52 In 1884,
the United States Supreme Court ruled that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not incorporate the Fifth Amendment’s grand jury
right, allowing states to discard the institution if they chose.53 Some
did;54 many others limited it, by curtailing the grand jury’s capacity to
initiate investigations, subpoena witnesses or other evidence, or
consider an indictment or issue a report without the assent of a public
prosecutor.55
By the twentieth century, the grand jury’s powers had been
significantly curtailed. With limited exceptions, grand juries in most
states no longer held the reins of investigations and prosecutions.56
Public prosecutors did—and they utilized the grand jury to their
48 See RICHARD D. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE’S PANEL: THE GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1634–1941, at 19–40 (1963); Richard M. Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 MICH. L.
REV. 455, 456–58 (1965).
49 YOUNGER, supra note 48, at 41–42.
50 Ronald F. Wright, Grand Juries and Expertise in the Administrative State, in GRAND JURY
2.0: MODERN PERSPECTIVES ON THE GRAND JURY 293, 294–96 (Roger Anthony Fairfax ed.,
2011).
51 YOUNGER, supra note 48, at 134–48.
52 Id. at 148–54.
53 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884).
54 YOUNGER, supra note 48, at 151–54.
55 Wright, supra note 50, at 298–300.
56 Id. Those exceptions largely involved public corruption involving prosecutors
themselves. See YOUNGER, supra note 48, at 182–208.
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advantage, by compelling the production of evidence and obtaining
sworn, recorded testimony inculpating the target of their investigation.
A criminal investigation that impaneled a grand jury had become no
more a search for truth than one that did not: prosecutors now
controlled the evidence presented, and so controlled the facts the
grand jury could find.
In this new era, the secrecy rules that had powered the grand
jury’s lapsed role as government overseer were no longer necessary.
Having effectively become an arm of the state, the grand jury hardly
needed to shield itself from it. Yet rather than altering or amending
grand jury secrecy rules to take account of new institutional
circumstances, courts instead rebranded those rules as necessary to
protect the state’s investigation from outside interference. A 1958
United States Supreme Court case, the first to remark on the purposes
served by grand jury secrecy in the modern era, described them as
follows:
(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be
contemplated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury
in its deliberations, and to prevent persons subject to indictment or
their friends from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent
subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may
testify before grand jury and later appear at the trial of those
indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures
by persons who have information with respect to the commission of
crimes; (5) to protect innocent accused who is exonerated from
disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation, and
from the expense of standing trial where there was no probability
of guilt.57

The first through fourth listed purposes enunciated by the Court
are all variations on the rationale of protecting an investigation from
interference by nonstate actors. The final listed purpose invokes
secrecy as a means of protecting the presumption of innocence. As
compared to accusations by private prosecutors, those by a public
prosecutor carried significant weight and credibility; accordingly,
merely the specter of a public prosecutor’s investigation presented a
risk of reputational and pecuniary harm. Although not originally
designed to protect uncharged persons, grand jury secrecy fit well with
that purpose. Today, these justifications—protection of investigative
integrity and from reputational harm—are now well-accepted by
courts (both state and federal) and scholars.58
57 United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681 n.6 (1958) (quoting
United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628–29 (3d Cir. 1954)).
58 As the leading treatise on grand juries describes this conventional wisdom, “[t]he
secrecy of grand jury proceedings is thought to promote a variety of important interests,
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By the middle of the twentieth century, then, the accepted
rationale for grand jury secrecy had adapted to a new institutional
reality. As the next Section demonstrates, the secrecy requirement
itself has not.
b. Current Dynamics
Today, roughly half of states along with the federal system require
a grand jury indictment to prosecute a serious criminal charge
(typically characterized as a felony crime), and some states continue to
utilize grand juries even if not required.59 Across jurisdictions utilizing
grand juries, secrecy is universal.60
Originally intended to constrain state power, grand jury secrecy
today amplifies it. Secrecy prevents those potentially in possession of
exculpatory evidence from knowing enough about the course, or even
existence, of the investigation to come forward to prosecutors.61 It
allows the prosecution to use bare minimum methods of evidence
collection and presentation (such as summary witnesses and hearsay
testimony), without the inevitable critique that would attend public
exposure.62 It enables prosecutors to control the grand jury process—
from decisions about subpoenaing witnesses and physical evidence to
those about whether to bring charges and which charges to bring—
without public pressure to permit greater grand jury autonomy
(pressure that would surely accompany public insight into the grand
jury process).63 And it allows the prosecution to keep its investigatory
tactics hidden from the public at large. In short, grand jury secrecy
shrouds the most pivotal aspects of the public prosecutor’s role—
gathering evidence, identifying targets, and weighing charges—
effectively insulating them from critique.

such as avoiding embarrassment to persons who are investigated but not charged,
preventing prejudicial leaks of information to potential defendants, and reducing the
danger that grand jury witnesses will be threatened or importuned by persons with an
interest in the outcome of the proceeding.” BEALE ET AL., supra note 47, § 5:1.
59 Id. § 1.7.
60 See Appendix: Grand Jury Secrecy Rules.
61 See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 n.24 (1948) (noting one of the benefits of public
trials is “[they] come to the attention of key witnesses unknown to the parties. These
witnesses may then voluntarily come forward and give important testimony”).
62 Most jurisdictions permit hearsay and summary testimony. See BEALE ET AL., supra
note 47, §§ 9.6, 9.7 (describing practice and potential for abuses).
63 Id. § 4.15 (“[F]or the most part it is the prosecutor who determines what witnesses
and evidence the grand jury will hear and what charges will be presented to it.”); id. § 6.2
(describing precise practices in different jurisdictions, noting only four states presently give
the grand jury any control over the subpoena power).
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Against these enormous costs, the proffered benefits of grand jury
secrecy pale. In fact, upon closer inspection, many of those supposed
benefits turn out to be less salutary than advertised.
Sealed grand jury proceedings do little, in practice, to prevent
witness tampering, subornation of perjury, and other forms of
obstruction, as grand jury witnesses in most jurisdictions are permitted
to discuss the fact and substance of their testimony with anyone both
before and after they have testified.64 In any event, obstructive conduct
is already deterred through independent penal sanctions; it is not at
all clear that sealing grand jury proceedings from the public offers any
marginal increase in deterrence. Nor does secrecy grant reticent
witnesses durable protection, as prosecutors in many jurisdictions must
disclose to the defense prospective trial witnesses and any prior
statements made by them.65 Though trials are rare, prosecutors can
hardly promise witnesses at the pre-charging stage that the case will
assuredly not reach the pre-trial witness disclosure stage.
Sealed grand jury proceedings likewise do little to protect free
grand jury deliberations. So long as secrecy of deliberations is maintained, there is no need to maintain the secrecy of the pre-deliberation
proceeding. Petit juries regularly deliberate freely and in secret
following a fully public trial.
Similarly overstated is secrecy’s touted protection of innocent
targets and subjects. In practice, persons negatively affected by grand
jury leaks have had little success in seeking remedial relief. Courts
generally do not recognize a private right of action for violations of
grand jury secrecy; and even when courts are willing to probe a leak,
64 In thirty-two states and the federal system, witnesses before the grand jury are
omitted from the secrecy constraints imposed on other grand jury participants. See ALASKA
R. CRIM. P. 6(l)(1); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-514 (2021); CAL. PENAL CODE § 924.2 (West
2021); DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2); D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 15-12-67, 15-12-68 (2021); HAW. R. PENAL P. 6(e)(1); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-1112
(2021); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/112-6 (2021); IOWA R. CRIM. P. 2.3(4)(d); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-3012(b) (2019); ME. R. CRIM. P. 6(e); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 5(d); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-729 (2021); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-11-317(2) (2021); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1410 (2021);
N.H. R. CRIM. P. 8(b)(6); N.J. CT. R. 3:6-7; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-6-6(A) (2021); N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 190.25(4)(a) (McKinney 2021); OHIO R. CRIM. P. 6(E); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22,
§ 355(C) (2021); PA. R. CRIM. P. 556.10(B)(3); R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 14-7-1720(A) (2021); TENN. R. CRIM. P. 6(k); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-1013(7)(b) (West 2021); VT. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-192 (2021); W. VA. R.
CRIM. P. 6(e)(2); WIS. STAT. §§ 968.40–968.53 (2021); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-5-208 (2021);
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
65 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE §§ 20.5(e), (f) (4th ed. 2020) (noting the federal system and about half of all
states require prosecutors to disclose prospective trial witnesses, and slightly fewer than half
of states require disclosure also of those witnesses’ prior statements on matters that will be
the subject of their testimony).
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proving its source is exceedingly difficult.66 What’s more, prosecutors
regularly expose uncharged persons through “speaking indictments,”
the factual details of which often leave little doubt as to the identities
of unnamed persons.67 And prosecutors can and do publicly reveal
investigatory information presented to the grand jury, so long as the
information has an independent source.68
Not only does grand jury secrecy in practice fall short of
protecting subjects and targets from reputational harm, but it also can
confer on prosecutors a reputational benefit. When prosecutors wish
to evade accountability for investigatory or charging decisions, they
can utilize the grand jury to that end—by selectively disclosing
evidence presented to the grand jury,69 seeking court orders to unseal
66 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation (90-3-2), 748 F. Supp. 1188 (E.D. Mich. 1990)
(finding no private right of action for violations of federal grand jury secrecy rule, holding
violations only enforceable via criminal contempt proceeding); Barry v. United States, 740
F. Supp. 888 (D.D.C. 1990) (on remand of civil action against government for grand jury
leaks, finding extensive evidence of leaked material but insufficient evidence that
government was the source of it).
67 See Anthony S. Barkow & Beth George, Prosecuting Political Defendants, 44 GA. L. REV.
953, 1003–05 (2010) (describing common use of speaking indictments, and critiques of the
practice). Perhaps the most recent high-profile example is the indictment of Roger Stone,
which made reference to numerous unnamed, uncharged persons and organizations that
were readily identified. See Indictment, United States v. Stone, No. 19-CR-00018 (D.D.C.
filed Jan. 24, 2019); Dustin Volz, From Organization 1 to Person 2: Who’s Who in the Roger Stone
Indictment, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 26, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/from-organization-1to-person-2-whos-who-in-the-roger-stone-indictment-11548461792
[https://perma.cc
/LG8D-535E].
68 See, e.g., United States v. Rosen, 471 F. Supp. 2d 651, 655 (E.D. Va. 2007) (“Leaks
of information from law enforcement investigations that relate to matters under grand jury
investigation do not concern ‘matters before the grand jury,’ unless, of course, they disclose
secret details about proceedings inside the grand jury room. In other words, . . . ‘the
disclosure of information coincidentally before the grand jury [which can] be revealed in
such a manner that its revelation would not elucidate the inner workings of the grand jury
is not prohibited’ by Rule 6(e).” (quoting In re Sealed Case No. 99-3091, 192 F.3d 995, 1002
(D.C. Cir. 1999)).
69 A particularly egregious example occurred in the investigation into the police
killing of Tamir Rice, a twelve-year-old black child shot by police while playing with a toy
gun; during the two-month long grand jury investigation, the Cuyahoga County prosecutor
repeatedly disclosed witness statements and police reports that exculpated the police officer
suspects. See Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Mitch Smith, Tamir Rice’s Family Clashes with Prosecutor
Over Police Killing, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/24/us
/tamir-rices-family-and-prosecutor-quarrel-over-release-of-evidence.html [https://perma
.cc/A7ET-JHAL]. A subsequent request by Rice’s family to release the full grand jury
proceedings—so that they and the public could have access to the entirety of the evidence
considered by the grand jury rather than only that selectively disclosed by the prosecutor—
was denied, notwithstanding the court’s displeasure at the prosecutor’s conduct. See In re
Investigation of the November 22, 2014 Shooting Death of Tamir Rice, 109 N.E.3d 608, 616
(Ohio Ct. App. 2018) (“The fact that the office of the former prosecuting attorney
disseminated selected portions of the evidence presented to the grand jury under the guise
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the grand jury proceedings after having tailored them for public
consumption,70 or, conversely, seeking to keep the proceedings secret
while minimizing their agency in the grand jury process.71 That the
reputational gambit is not always successful is, in part, a result of court-

of ‘transparency’ was inappropriate.”). For a critique of the use of the grand jury in the
Tamir Rice investigation, see Ric Simmons, The Role of the Prosecutor and the Grand Jury in
Police Use of Deadly Force Cases: Restoring the Grand Jury to Its Original Purpose, 65 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 519, 528 (2017).
70 This has happened most notably in high-profile investigations of law enforcement
shootings. For instance, in the investigation of Darren Wilson for the killing of Michael
Brown, a review of the grand jury transcript revealed a highly unusual proceeding in which
exculpatory evidence was presented, the target was not questioned aggressively, and the
grand jury was not presented with proposed charges. See Julie Bosman, Campbell
Robertson, Erik Eckholm & Richard A. Oppel Jr., Amid Conflicting Accounts, Trusting Darren
Wilson, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/26/us/fergusongrand-jury-weighed-mass-of-evidence-much-of-it-conflicting.html
[https://perma.cc
/YMH5-257F]. Yet when a grand juror claimed the prosecutor’s disclosures did not fully
portray the grand jury proceedings and sought court permission to speak publicly about
what had transpired, her request was denied. See Doe v. McCulloch, 106 F. Supp. 3d 1007,
1015 (E.D. Mo. 2015), vacated, 835 F.3d 785, 786 (8th Cir. 2016).
71 For instance, the prosecutor in the investigation into the killing of Breonna Taylor,
an unarmed innocent black woman shot to death by Lexington, Kentucky, police officers
during a raid of her home, sought to foist responsibility for the absence of indictments on
the grand jury, claiming it had “agreed” that the officers’ use of force was justified and
charges against them unmerited. Tessa Duvall, Two Breonna Taylor Grand Jurors Are Telling
Their Story. Why That’s Important, LOUISVILLE COURIER J. (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www
.courier-journal.com/story/news/local/breonna-taylor/2020/10/27/two-breonna-taylorgrand-jurors-telling-their-story/6051938002/ [https://perma.cc/9A5Y-CGTG].
When
several grand jurors then sought court permission to reveal publicly the charges that were
in fact presented to the grand jury, the prosecutor opposed their request. After receiving
court permission, the grand jurors disclosed that the grand jury was not asked to consider
any charges against the officers who had killed Ms. Taylor and returned the only charges
presented (wanton endangerment against an officer who had shot into a neighboring
apartment). Id. A nearly identical scenario had unfolded several years earlier in the police
killing of Eric Garner, though the court in that case ultimately did not permit a full
disclosure of the grand jury proceedings—allowing the prosecutor’s limited, self-serving
disclosures to constitute the entirety of the public record. See In re James v. Donovan, 14
N.Y.S.3d 435 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (noting with approval earlier court’s granting
prosecutor’s permission to disclose length of grand jury investigation, number of witnesses
and evidentiary exhibits presented and legal principles on which grand jury was instructed,
but denying media and civil rights advocates’ requests, over prosecutor’s objection, to
disclose full grand jury proceedings).
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ordered disclosures.72 Grand jury secrecy, in short, can in theory help
prosecutors as much or even more than it helps targets and subjects.73
Secret grand jury proceedings could, in certain cases, mitigate a
target’s flight risk. Yet for charged defendants flight risk is considered
on a case-by-case basis, with conditions of release set (or pretrial
detention ordered) accordingly. It is unclear why sealing grand jury
proceedings should not also be imposed based on individualized risk
assessment. Nor is it clear why grand jury proceedings should remain
hidden from public view after the target has been charged and flight
risk has been considered and mitigated through the pretrial releasedetention process.
All of this is not to discount entirely secrecy’s protective benefits,
or to advocate for fully open grand jury proceedings akin to public
trials. Rather, it is to draw attention to secrecy’s tax on prosecutorial
accountability and comparatively low payout on its purported
justifications. Clearly some grand jury proceedings should be kept
secret, at least for some time. But by maintaining indefinite secrecy as
the default for all grand jury proceedings, and by giving prosecutors
near exclusive control over the extent to which secrecy is maintained,

72 Prosecutors overseeing the grand jury investigations into the killings of Michael
Brown and Tamir Rice (in which the full grand jury proceedings were disclosed) both lost
reelection. See Vince Grzegorek, Embattled Prosecutor Tim McGinty Loses Democratic Primary
to Mike O’Malley, CLEVELAND SCENE (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.clevescene.com/sceneand-heard/archives/2016/03/16/embattled-prosecutor-tim-mcginty-loses-democraticprimary-to-mike-omalley-in-prosecutors-race [https://perma.cc/PVK9-4PDY] (describing
vote “as a referendum on McGinty’s handling of” the Rice case, among other police use of
force cases); Cleve R. Wootson Jr., Voters Oust Prosecutor Accused of Favoring Ferguson Officer
Who Killed Michael Brown, WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/post-nation/wp/2018/08/08/voters-oust-prosecutor-accused-of-favoring-fergusonofficer-who-killed-michael-brown/ [https://perma.cc/QM3U-M7C6] (describing primary
vote as “a referendum on what happened in Ferguson”). The prosecutor who oversaw the
grand jury investigation into the killing of Eric Garner (in which grand jury proceedings
were not disclosed) did not run for re-election as district attorney, but instead sought, and
won, his district’s U.S. congressional seat; that election did not center on the Garner case.
See Alexander Burns, Donovan, Staten Island Prosecutor, Wins Congressional Seat Grimm Held,
N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/06/nyregion/danieldonovan-elected-to-congress-from-new-york.html [https://perma.cc/TD23-L9Z5]. The
prosecutor in the Breonna Taylor case, Daniel Cameron, is still currently in his first term.
See Daniel Cameron, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Daniel_Cameron [https://
perma.cc/W8H3-A3TM].
73 It is worth noting that, while recent prosecutorial leveraging of grand jury secrecy
has arisen most visibly in police use of force investigations, it is not limited to those cases.
See, e.g., In re 2010 Denver Cnty. Grand Jury, 296 P.3d 168, 170 (Colo. App. 2012)
(investigation of police officer perjury); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 580 N.E.2d 868, 869
(Ct. Com. Pl. Ohio 1991) (investigation of corruption by county building inspectors); State
v. Kearney, 263 A.2d 817 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div. 1970) (multiple murders).
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criminal procedure has enlarged enforcers’ power and discretion by
shielding them from public accountability.74
2. Targeting
a. Historical Development
Prior to professionalized law enforcement, victims and
community members primarily enforced penal laws, either by bringing
charges on their own or through a public prosecutor.75 Which criminal
laws were enforced were thus a direct function of what crimes were
committed and which of those crimes victims and community
members wished to prosecute. William Nelson’s study of Middlesex
County, Massachusetts in the years before and after the Revolutionary
War shows how criminal prosecutions for particular categories of crime
ebbed and flowed according to both changes in the commission of
certain crimes and changes in community perceptions of which crimes
were worthy of prosecution.76
With the rise of professional police and prosecutors in the late
nineteenth century, the decision of which crimes to investigate and
charge shifted from victims and community members to salaried
officials. This shift did not happen immediately; victims remained the
primary drivers of felony arrests and prosecutions into the early
twentieth century.77 But by the Prohibition era, police and public
prosecutors had become the primary enforcers of criminal laws. It was
they who determined whom to investigate, whom to charge, and with
what crimes. Indeed, Prohibition itself was characterized by vast
geographic disparities in enforcement, in large part a function of
variance in local police departments’ attitudes towards liquor bans.78
In the early republic, the role of laypersons in the targeting
process was a direct constraint on enforcement power: the power was
invoked only if and when a victim or community invoked it. With the

74 Part III develops how to better balance the benefits and drawbacks of grand jury
secrecy.
75 See supra notes 24–28 and accompanying text.
76 See Nelson, supra note 26, at 452–59 (observing a marked decrease in prosecutions
of offenses against morals in the years following the War, corresponding to the
“emergence . . . of a new social and legal attitude toward the immorality that had always
existed,” and fluctuations in prosecutions of theft offenses, which seemed to rise and fall in
accordance with the county’s economic distress).
77 Ouziel, supra note 39, at 716–17 (discussing early police departments’ primary role
managing public order through patrol, social welfare, and arrests for low-level public order
offenses, with almost no involvement in investigation and prosecution of felony crimes).
78 Daniel Richman & Sarah A. Seo, How Federalism Built the FBI, Sustained Local Police,
and Left Out the States, 17 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 421, 433–34 (2022).
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shift to professional policing and prosecution, enforcement power was
no longer constrained by the public’s targeting preferences. And yet,
there were few procedures that arose to compensate. The advent of
prosecutor elections in the mid-nineteenth century79 injected an
element of public input into state targeting decisions. But there is a
vast and important distinction between categorical priorities, typically
the subject of public announcements and campaigns, and the granular
decisionmaking occurring outside public view. Enforcers may declare
they will focus on crimes of violence, or drug sales, or loansharking or
insider trading—but which perpetrators, in which neighborhoods, or
at which companies, will they pursue?
These are the decisions that steer the power and resources of the
state and its criminal enforcement apparatus in one direction or
another, generating cascading effects on individuals, communities,
and industries. And yet, as the next Section shows, criminal procedure
has developed no mechanisms to provide oversight and accountability
for them.
b. Current Dynamics
How are targeting decisions made? Serious crimes against
individual victims remain victim or eyewitness generated. A 911 call
reporting a homicide or robbery, or a victim reporting a high-dollar
fraud will lead to an investigation and, if sufficient evidence is
gathered, an arrest and charge. The public can keep tabs on crime
reports that do not result in arrests through clearance rates, which are
publicly reported by most police departments.80 But it cannot keep
track of the investigations that do not arise from victim or witness
reports.
Of these there are many. At the retail level, a police officer may
observe suspicious conduct while on patrol, leading to a stop, pat
down, and potentially discovery of contraband resulting in an arrest.
Or a detective may utilize a paid informant who provides information
about people and crimes about which the informant happens to know.
At the wholesale level, law enforcement agencies may opt to focus
79 See Abraham S. Goldstein, Prosecution: History of the Public Prosecutor, in 3
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUSTICE 1242, 1243 (Joshua Dressler, Thomas J. Bernard,
Deborah W. Denno, Richard S. Frase, John Hagan, Dan M. Kahan & Carol S. Steiker eds.,
2d ed. 2002).
80 See 1 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLICE SCIENCE 182 (Jack R. Greene, Gary W. Cordner,
Edward R. Maguire & Peter K. Manning eds., 3d ed. 2007) (“clearance data has been
systematically collected through the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), permitting long-term
trend analysis”). But see Shima Baradaran Baughman, How Effective Are Police? The Problem
of Clearance Rates and Criminal Accountability, 72 ALA. L. REV. 47, 61–65 (2020) (critiquing
clearance rates as too susceptible to manipulation by police departments).
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enforcement on particular neighborhoods, industries, or categories of
conduct81—decisions that may or may not arise from victim or witness
reports. And even the distinction between retail and wholesale
investigatory decisions is somewhat illusory. Given the role of
informants and accomplices in investigations, decisions about
individual targets have cascading enforcement effects. One investigation’s target becomes the next investigation’s informant, and so forth
and so on—generating reactive investigatory chains that can end up
narrowing enforcement resources on particular groups of offenders to
the exclusion of other equally or perhaps more culpable groups.
Enforcement patterns, in other words, are not necessarily the product
of intentioned enforcement priorities.82
Scholars have long observed the near absence of judicial oversight
of prosecutorial discretion, and its role in expanding criminal
enforcement power.83 But the absence of public data on targeting has
played at least an equal, if not a greater, role. Publicly available
targeting data is, after all, a prerequisite to judicial intervention.84 The
Supreme Court’s discovery standard in selective prosecution claims is
rightly criticized as impossible to meet85—but it is impossible only
because data on enforcement selection is kept secret.

81 See Mila Sohoni, Crackdowns, 103 VA. L. REV. 31 (2017) (discussing law enforcement
decisions to “crack down” on certain categories of offenses); Tracey L. Meares, Programming
Errors: Understanding the Constitutionality of Stop-and-Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U.
CHI. L. REV. 159, 168–69, 174 (2015) (discussing law enforcement decisions to direct street
patrol to, and utilize aggressive stop-and-frisk practices in, particular neighborhoods);
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Prosecution, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 705, 708–27
(2016) (discussing use by police and prosecutors of data algorithms to predict the most
dangerous areas and offenders, informing decisions around where to patrol, whom to
investigate, and whom and what to charge).
82 See Lauren M. Ouziel, Steering White-Collar Enforcement, 97 TEX. L. REV. ONLINE 44
(2019) (discussing divergence between envisioned use of federal penal laws against
relatively high-level offenders and actual enforcement patterns that skew to the relatively
lower level).
83 See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1978 (2008);
Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1024–26
(2006). While discretion is distinct from power, the two are closely related—particularly
when it comes to the discretion to select who and what shall be the target of enforcement
resources (and who and what shall not). See Sklansky, supra note 44, at 488–89 (“[T]he
more discretion that prosecutors have, the greater will be the concern, generally speaking,
about the power they exercise and vice versa.”).
84 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 470 (1996) (setting a Catch-22 in
which, to proceed to discovery on a selective prosecution claim, a plaintiff must first show
evidence of different prosecutorial treatment of similarly situated persons). The evidence
required by Armstrong is, of course, unavailable because prosecutorial targeting and
declination decisions are not made public.
85 See Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the Pitfalls of
Armstrong, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 605, 640 (1998) (“The Armstrong holding and the
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Consider the recent litigation over New York’s stop-and-frisk
practices. The allegations in the class action complaint in Floyd v. City
of New York86 were based on two antecedent public data disclosures: one
by the Office of the New York Attorney General (OAG) detailing the
findings of its investigation into the New York City Police Department’s
stop-and-frisk practices in the wake of the Amadou Diallo killing, and
the other by the New York City Police Department itself, disclosing
quarterly stop-and-frisk data in response to a 2001 public records law
and a 2003 legal settlement of a case that was likewise founded on the
results of the earlier OAG investigation.87 In this respect, New York is
not an anomaly—in Philadelphia88 and Los Angeles,89 government
investigations of police departments led to disclosures of data on
police-citizen interactions, which in turn fueled judicial oversight and
continuing mandated data disclosures.
Judicial oversight, moreover, is only one modality for constraining
enforcement power. Public opinion and political pressure are others,
yet their exercise is similarly dependent on the public disclosure of
enforcement selection data. In New York and Philadelphia, media and
public attention generated from publicized stop-and-frisk data
resulted in mayoral elections in both cities that focused heavily on the
candidates’ positions on patrol targeting practices—with the ultimately
victorious candidates campaigning heavily on vows to reform those

implications of its reasoning create a barrier to discovery that, for the great majority of
criminal cases, is insuperable.”).
86 Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 01034
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2008).
87 See Baker & Vasquez, supra note 8 (recounting passage of New York City Council
Law in 2001 that mandated NYPD disclosure of citizen stops, and subsequent legal action
by City Council and civil liberties groups to ensure NYPD compliance). The disclosures
made pursuant to the 2001 Police Reporting Law ultimately paved the way for the class
action in Floyd v. City of New York. See Denvir, supra note 8; see also Second Amended Class
Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Individual Damages & Demand
for Jury Trial at 24–29, Floyd v. City of New York, No. 08 CV 01034 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2008)
(grounding allegations of illegally race-based stop-and-frisk practices on data from OAG
investigation and NYPD data disclosures).
88 The information made public by way of a federal investigation and prosecution of
Philadelphia narcotics officers in the early 1990s for framing, beating, and robbing suspects
led to a subsequent lawsuit by the NAACP, which in turn resulted in court-mandated and monitored continuing police department data disclosures. See Complaint & Demand for
Jury Trial at 18–21, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-cv-05952 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2010).
Those disclosures ultimately gave rise to a subsequent suit against the city in 2010 for stopand-frisk violations, the settlement of which spawned renewed police department data
disclosures on stops and frisks. See Settlement Agreement, Class Certification, and Consent
Decree at 3–5, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-cv-05952 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2011).
89 See Consent Decree, United States v. City of Los Angeles, No. 00-11769 (C.D. Cal.
June 15, 2001).
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practices.90 In New York, political pressure also generated immediate
response by local leaders: the city council passed new police oversight
legislation, and the police department ultimately reduced the use of
targeting practices that resulted in high levels of street stops of
minorities well before a federal court ordered it to do so.91 Similarly,
lawsuits challenging racial profiling in car stops in the 1990s, and the
data the litigation revealed, brought greater public attention to racial
disparities in car stops.92 This led to a series of state laws mandating

90 See Michael Barbaro & David W. Chen, De Blasio Is Elected New York City Mayor in
Landslide, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/06/nyregion/deblasio-is-elected-new-york-city-mayor.html [https://perma.cc/QQY3-VY24]; Anna Orso, Jim
Kenney Wins: Here’s Where the New Mayor Stands on Pot, Policing and 5 Other Topics, BILLY PENN
(Nov. 3. 2015), https://billypenn.com/2015/11/03/jim-kenney-wins-heres-where-theprobable-new-mayor-stands-on-pot-policing-and-5-other-topics [https://perma.cc/44CFJQLM] (describing Mayor Kenney’s vow to end the Philadelphia Police Department’s stopand-frisk practices as “one of the pillars of [his] campaign”).
91 J. David Goodman, City Council Votes to Increase Oversight of New York Police, N.Y.
TIMES (June 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/nyregion/new-york-citycouncil-votes-to-increase-oversight-of-police-dept.html
[https://perma.cc/W42J-NPJ7]
(reporting passage of the Community Safety Act that would, among other things, create an
independent inspector general to monitor NYPD policies and practices and make it easier
for plaintiffs to sue the NYPD for bias-based profiling); Wendy Ruderman, Number of Frisks
Fell in ‘12, Police Data Show, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02
/09/nyregion/number-of-frisks-fell-in-12-police-data-show.html
[https://perma.cc
/AM9N-BEX3] (reporting that “[a]fter criticism from a federal judge last spring and
widening political protests,” new police officer stop-and-frisk training was instituted,
resulting in a thirty-four percent decrease in stops in the last three quarters of 2012
compared to the same period in 2011). The trial court did not enter a decision and ruling
in Floyd until August 2013. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y.
2013).
In Philadelphia, a consent decree had little initial effect on the number of illegal stops
and frisks; only after the election of a new mayor (who had campaigned heavily on
eliminating illegal stop-and-frisk practices) and his appointment of a new police
commissioner did the police department make marked progress. See Plaintiffs’ Ninth
Report to Court and Monitor on Stop and Frisk Practices: Fourth Amendment Issues at 1,
3, Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, No. 10-5952 (E.D. Pa. 2018), https://www.aclupa.org/sites
/default/files/field_documents/bailey_ninth_report_11-20-18_.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/S6PF-BKEE] (recounting slow reductions in numbers of illegal stops and frisks, from half
of all stops in the two quarters before the consent decree conducted without reasonable
suspicion to approximately forty percent in the years following, and then, following the new
administration’s adoption of internal compliance measures in early 2016, a thirty-five
percent decrease in stops overall, with a quarter of stops conducted without reasonable
suspicion).
92 See David A. Harris, Racial Profiling, 34 CRIM. JUST. 10, 11–12 (2020); see also Frank
R. Baumgartner, Leah Christiani, Derek A. Epp, Kevin Roach & Kelsey Shoub, Racial
Disparities in Traffic Stop Outcomes, 9 DUKE F. FOR L. & SOC. CHANGE 21, 23 (2017) (discussing
rising public attention to racial disparities in traffic stops in the late 1990s).
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data keeping and disclosure of the race of drivers subjected to car stops
and searches,93 which in turn led to reforms in some jurisdictions.94
Yet jurisdictions with robust data keeping and reporting on
targeting practices are outliers; the vast majority of the over 15,000
general purpose law enforcement agencies operating in the United
States95 have not been subject to government investigations generating
data disclosures on targeting and selection, or to state legislative
mandates. And even the few jurisdictions that have disclosed data as a
result of government investigations or legislative mandates have only
disclosed data specific to the discreet conduct under investigation or
legislatively mandated.96 The criteria by which law enforcement
agencies target enforcement, the frequency and nature of interactions
that fall short of arrest, the circumstances that determine when and
what charges are filed—in almost every jurisdiction, these metrics
remain invisible.
The few government investigations and private lawsuits to have
generated data disclosures, moreover, focus on alleged illegal actions
by police patrol officers. But patrol officers are not the only enforcers
who select whom to arrest and charge, and legality is not the only
measure by which law enforcement is (or should be) assessed. In
recent years there has been growing scholarly and public attention to
targeting and selection decisions by the broader law enforcement
community—police detectives, prosecutors, and federal law enforcement agents—that, while not illegal, are nevertheless undesirable in
their adverse impacts on racial minorities, the poor, and the relatively
less culpable offenders within a criminal offense category.97 Yet data
93 See Baumgartner et al., supra note 92, at 26–28 (2017) (finding eight states, as of
2017, mandating ongoing data collection and reporting of traffic stops by driver’s race).
94 See FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, DEREK A. EPP & KELSEY SHOUB, SUSPECT CITIZENS:
WHAT 20 MILLION TRAFFIC STOPS TELL US ABOUT POLICING AND RACE 197–205 (2018)
(following adoption of mandated consent-to-search forms for all traffic stops in three North
Carolina jurisdictions, observing substantially decreased consent searches in all three
jurisdictions and, in study of police trust in one of those jurisdictions (data was unavailable
for the others), finding significantly increased levels of community trust in police).
95 SHELLEY S. HYLAND & ELIZABETH DAVIS, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2016:
PERSONNEL 1 (2019).
96 In New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Philadelphia, for instance, police
departments only disclosed data on patrol stops; in states mandating traffic stop data
disclosures, see Baumgartner et al., supra note 92, law enforcement agencies only disclosed
that data.
97 On targeting of local drug investigations, see Nirej S. Sekhon, Redistributive Policing,
101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1199–1203 (2012) (discussing racial impacts of Seattle
Police Department’s decisions to focus drug enforcement on crack offenses in downtown
neighborhoods). On targeting in the federal system, see Miriam H. Baer, Sorting Out WhiteCollar Crime, 97 TEX. L. REV. 225 (2018) (fraud offenses); Lauren M. Ouziel, Ambition and
Fruition in Federal Criminal Law: A Case Study, 103 VA. L. REV. 1077 (2017) (drug offenses);
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on targeting decisions is scant. Visible inequities in criminal justice
outcomes give us just enough information to distrust a decisionmaking process that leads to them, but we lack the sort of granular
information to evaluate precisely where and how that process goes
awry, and what levers would be most effective to improve it.
This informational deficit can extend to enforcers themselves.
Many police departments, for instance, now rely on algorithms to
target neighborhoods and offenders for heightened enforcement,
unaware of the data being fed into those algorithms and thus oblivious
to the specific circumstances underlying individual and collective
targeting decisions.98 And in circumstances involving accomplices and
informants, targeting is less a decision than a reaction to some earlier
targeting decision which can itself be an artifact of an even earlier
investigative event—such that by the time of an arrest or charge, the
key decisionmaking that led to it is no longer accessible for internal
evaluation and critique.
3. Declination
a. Historical Development
As mighty as the power to pursue the penal sanction is the power
to demur. In the early republic, crime victims exercised the power to
decline charges routinely, aided by excessive penalties that encouraged would-be defendants to settle accusations with a sum.99 Inherent
in such a system was the risk of abuse: victims effectively could extort
financial settlements from persons they accused of crimes. In this
respect, instruments of the state played an important constraining
Jesse J. Norris & Hanna Grol-Prokopczyk, Estimating the Prevalence of Entrapment in Post-9/11
Terrorism Cases, 105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 609, 638–46 (2015) (terrorism offenses).
98 As Andrew Guthrie Ferguson has explained:
[P]olice purchase big data technologies [from private companies] without the
ability to interrogate them or even understand them. For patrol officers on the
street, this means blindly following predictive policing patrols without the ability
to challenge the findings or deconstruct its assumptions. For administrators, it
means trusting the algorithm based on the theory (or perhaps the result), but
without being able to articulate why the system works. This lack of transparency
is even more problematic when applied to predictive policing of individuals. A
police officer can see the result of the heightened “risk score,” but cannot really
explain how the score was calculated. As more and more bits of data get inputted
into a system, the more complicated it can be to visualize or explain the outputs.
For all intents and purposes, the data systems are dark to the end users and the
community.
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Illuminating Big Data Policing, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 503, 510
(2018).
99 Goldstein, supra note 79, at 1243.
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role. Both grand juries and judges often dismissed frivolous cases,
providing a measure of protection to prospective defendants who
refused to pay private prosecutors to withhold charges.100
Nevertheless, the potential for abuse of the declination power was
among the reasons for the shift to public prosecution and, eventually,
salaried professional prosecutors.101 The absence of a financial incentive in bringing and declining charges would help ameliorate abuse.
But whereas once the state had constrained a potentially abusive
process, now state power over declination introduced new risks:
namely, corruption and sloth.102 Public prosecutors could, and did,
decline charges against the politically well-connected, or simply
because they did not wish to expend the effort to pursue a case,
however meritorious.103
Faced with these new risks, criminal procedure did not develop
tools to mitigate them.104 To the contrary, criminal procedure treats
declination decisions just as it did when those decisions belonged
entirely to victims—as a private matter of choice. Once the choice was
a personal one; now it is a professional judgment to be exercised in the
public interest. But with few exceptions, the public has no way of
knowing if in fact its interests guide declination decisions. Indeed, it
has almost no insight into these decisions at all.
Rather than seeking to ameliorate this state of public ignorance,
criminal procedure has, if anything, perpetuated it. Through court
decisions, prosecutorial manuals, and rules of professional conduct,
criminal procedure has enshrined a narrative in which secrecy in
declination decisions protects prosecutors from public pressure to
charge, protects targets and subjects from reputational harm, and
generally enables the fair and impartial administration of justice.105
100 See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text.
101 See Goldstein, supra note 79, at 1244.
102 Id.
103 See id. at 1244–45.
104 Darryl Brown has argued that two features of the U.S. system—prosecutor elections
and overlapping federal and state jurisdiction for many crimes—have enabled some form
of oversight into decisions not to prosecute. See Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Enforcement
Redundancy: Oversight of Decisions Not to Prosecute, 103 MINN. L. REV. 843, 846–47 (2018). As
Brown himself acknowledges, the inherent political and jurisdictional limitations of these
features have produced a “mixed track record.” Id. at 914. Moreover, there is a key
limitation Brown does not mention: most declinations are secret. Public visibility into
declinations is a prerequisite to an effective electoral or federalism-based oversight strategy.
The examples Brown uses of effective federal or electoral oversight all involve high-profile
investigations in which the public and the Department of Justice knew local prosecutors
had declined charges. Id. at 878–84. As discussed below, these situations are the rare
exception, not the norm.
105 See Jessica A. Roth, Prosecutorial Declination Statements, 110 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 477, 481 & nn.11–13 (2020) (discussing how justifications for secrecy in
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While this narrative is compelling at the individual case level, it is a
poor fit for aggregate disclosures, which would neither identify
individuals nor subject prosecutors to pressure in individual cases.
What’s more, our current system does not always protect against
disclosures of individual declinations. As the next Section shows,
criminal procedure has produced neither complete secrecy nor
systematized aggregate disclosures of declination decisions, but rather
the worst of all worlds: an informational void punctuated by occasional,
haphazard, and likely unrepresentative disclosures.
b. Current Dynamics
Today, there are two types of actions commonly referred to as
declinations, and they have very different secrecy implications. The
first is a declination of initial charges: a law enforcement agent declines
to initiate an arrest and file a complaint in court, or a prosecutor
declines to initiate the filing of initial criminal charges in court. The
second action is a dismissal: following an arrest or summons and an
initial presentment of charges in court via a complaint (usually drafted
by a law enforcement officer), a prosecutor opts to dismiss the case
before the arraignment stage. Because dismissals follow publicly filed
charges, they are visible to the public. Courts keep records on them,106
and the press reports on them—particularly if the dismissals are
pursuant to a publicly-announced categorical policy directive (for
instance, prosecutors’ decisions to not pursue certain low-level charges
or charges against political protestors).107 (A diversion—a prosecutorial

declination decisions have manifested in Supreme Court decisions, DOJ charging manuals,
and ABA rules of professional conduct for prosecutors).
106 See, e.g., BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T JUST., FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN
COUNTIES, 2009, at 2–4 (arrest charges) & 24 tbl.21 (dismissals) (2013). This periodic
report on state court case processing in the largest seventy-five counties in the United States
was last issued in 2009; the report compiled state court data that continues to be publicly
available. Id.
107 See, e.g., Andrea Estes & Shelley Murphy, Stopping Injustice or Putting the Public at
Risk? Suffolk DA Rachael Rollins’s Tactics Spur Pushback, BOS. GLOBE (July 6, 2019), https://
www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2019/07/06/stopping-injustice-putting-public-risk-suffolkrachael-rollins-tactics-spur-pushback/IFC6Rp4tVHiVhOf2t97bFI/story.html
[https://
perma.cc/YXM9-DKRB] (reporting on Suffolk County District Attorney’s public directive
to prosecutors to dismiss fifteen low-level charges prior to arraignment); Shane Dixon
Kavanaugh, Multnomah County DA Declines to Prosecute 70% of Portland Protest Cases,
OREGONIAN (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.oregonlive.com/news/2020/10/multnomahcounty-da-declines-to-prosecute-70-of-portland-protest-cases.html [https://perma.cc/29665PUN] (reporting on Portland, Oregon, District Attorney’s announcement of decision to
decline to prosecute charges against most political protestors and subsequent creation of
public online dashboard tracking the progress and resolution of protestor cases referred by
police, including reasons given for dismissals).
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decision to divert a would-be prosecution into a treatment or services
program, most typically in cases involving drug possession—may take
the form either of a dismissal or a declination, depending on the
timing of the diversionary decision.)108
Unlike dismissals, declinations take place in the shadows. Because
no public charges were ever filed, prosecutors and law enforcement
agents can typically keep their decision to themselves if they choose.
And most do. Less than half of prosecutors’ offices in the United States
report case declinations to data repositories.109 Of states, only one
(Florida) systematically publishes case declination data.110
Of
individual jurisdictions outside the federal system, less than a half
dozen do.111 More to the point: outside the federal system, published
data on declinations almost never includes the reason (or reasons) for

108 See MELISSA LABRIOLA, WARREN A. REICH, ROBERT C. DAVIS, PRISCILLIA HUNT,
MICHAEL REMPEL & SAMANTHA CHERNEY, PROSECUTOR-LED PRETRIAL DIVERSION: CASE
STUDIES IN ELEVEN JURISDICTIONS, at viii (2018), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants
/251664.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6A9-G6TH] (in study of fifteen diversion programs in
eleven jurisdictions, three diverted cases before filing charges, eight did so after charges
were filed, and the remainder utilized both the pre- and post-filing methods); see also
Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, Models of Prosecutor-Led Diversion Programs in the United
States and Beyond, 4 ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY 331, 337–38 (2021) (observing the dearth of
transparency in, and oversight of, prosecutorial diversion in the United States).
109 STEVEN W. PERRY & DUREN BANKS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PROSECUTORS IN STATE
COURTS, 2007, at 8 tbl.10, 9 fig.3 (2011) (relying on the 2007 Census of State Court
Prosecutors, forty-seven percent of all state prosecutors’ offices reported declination data).
110 Measures for Justice, a private nonprofit foundation, compiles published criminal
justice data for all fifty states. See Measures, MEASURES FOR JUSTICE, https://measuresfor
justice.org/portal/measures [https://perma.cc/547X-HE5Z].
111 See Partner Offices, PROSECUTORIAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS, https://
prosecutorialperformanceindicators.org/#partners
[https://perma.cc/C9HE-TABG].
Only nine jurisdictions participate in the Prosecutorial Performance Indicators project
(described above at note 9) and not all publicize information on declinations. For instance,
on the data dashboards of the nine participating jurisdictions, only Cook County, Illinois;
Jacksonville, Florida; Tampa, Florida; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, publish data on declination rates. See Time and Resource Prioritization: Capacity
and Efficiency, PROSECUTORIAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS, https://prosecutorial
performanceindicators.org/time-and-resource-prioritization/ [https://perma.cc/E9ZXXTKT]. Of those, only Cook County provides data on declinations by offense category. See
Open Data, COOK COUNTY STATE’S ATTORNEY, https://www.cookcountystatesattorney.org
/about/case-level-data [https://perma.cc/Q92F-PHUA].
San Francisco does not
participate in the Prosecutorial Performance Indicators project, but does publish
generalized (non-offense-specific) declination data. See DA Stat, SAN FRANCISCO DISTRICT
ATTORNEY,
https://sfdistrictattorney.org/policy/da-stat/
[https://perma.cc/ERA5HSK3]. The Department of Justice provides detailed annual data on federal case
declinations. See, e.g., UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FISCAL
YEAR 2019, at 60 tbl.14, 61 tbl.15.
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declination.112 Except in the rare circumstance where a prosecutor’s
office invites researchers to conduct a study of the office’s declination
practices,113 or a media organization obtains access to normally secret
records through burdensome records requests,114 there is effectively
no public insight into the reasoning that underlies the decision to
refrain from filing charges. The omission is particularly glaring in
jurisdictions in which prosecutors have announced policies to refrain
from filing charges in certain categories of cases. While the policy
pronouncements offer a useful view into how a chief prosecutor wishes
or intends for line prosecutors to exercise charging discretion, the
absence of offense-specific declination data makes it impossible to
assess the degree of follow through and impact.115
112 See Shima Baradaran Baughman & Megan S. Wright, Prosecutors and Mass
Incarceration, 94 S. CAL. L. REV. 1123, 1130 n.32), available at https://ssrn.com
/abstract=3689242 (“We have national estimates on declination, but we do not have
information on whether prosecutors declined to charge because they lacked appropriate
evidence or because they felt that the crime did not warrant a charge. We also lack details
on cases that prosecutors declined to charge, which could provide insight into their
thinking on declination.”). Department of Justice declination data includes a listing of
cases declined by case type, agency, and reason. See, e.g., UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’, supra
note 111, at 60 tbl.14, 61 tbl.15.
113 Only a handful of such studies exist. See Miller & Wright, supra note 14 (studying
New Orleans District Attorney’s Office); BRUCE FREDERICK & DON STEMEN, VERA INST.
JUSTICE, THE ANATOMY OF DISCRETION: AN ANALYSIS OF PROSECUTORIAL DECISION MAKING
(2012) (studying two unidentified prosecutors’ offices); Wayne McKenzie, Don Stemen,
Derek Coursen & Elizabeth Farid, Prosecution and Racial Justice: Using Data to Advance
Fairness in Criminal Prosecution, VERA INST. JUSTICE. (2009) (study of declination decisions
and their racial impact in three counties); CASSIA SPOHN & KATHARINE TELLIS, NAT’L INST.
JUSTICE, POLICING AND PROSECUTING SEXUAL ASSAULT IN LOS ANGELES CITY AND COUNTY:
A COLLABORATIVE STUDY IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT,
THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, AND THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE (2012) (study of processing of sexual assault cases in Los
Angeles).
114 See, e.g., Bernice Yeung, Mark Greenblatt, Mark Fahey & Emily Harris, When It Comes
to Rape, Just Because a Case Is Cleared Doesn’t Mean It’s Solved, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 15, 2018)
https://www.propublica.org/article/when-it-comes-to-rape-just-because-a-case-is-cleareddoes-not-mean-solved [https://perma.cc/8Z2C-A8G7] (“Because exceptional clearance
data is not readily accessible to the public, we read through hundreds of police reports and
sent more than 100 public records requests to the largest law enforcement agencies in the
country. We analyzed data for more than 70,000 rape cases, providing an unprecedented
look at how America’s police close them.”); Eleanor Klibanoff, Prosecution Declined, KY. CTR.
FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Dec. 5, 2019), https://kycir.org/2019/12/05/prosecutiondeclined/ [https://perma.cc/R7PS-VK3X] (extensive investigation of declination of rape
cases in Louisville, Kentucky, utilizing police records and correspondence with prosecutors
obtained through records requests).
115 For instance, the district attorneys in both Suffolk County, Massachusetts, and
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, have publicly announced declination policies for certain
categories of low-level offenses, but have yet to make declination data accessible for public
review. See SUFFOLK CNTY. DIST. ATT’Y, THE RACHAEL ROLLINS POLICY MEMO 25 (2019),
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Despite the dearth of declination data, the exercise of the
declination power occasionally surfaces into public view, typically in
one of two ways. One occurs when a probable crime is publicly
reported and police or prosecutors confirm they are investigating it; if
charges are ultimately not brought, the public can surmise a prosecutor ultimately chose not to bring them. (Sometimes, prosecutors in
high-profile investigations opt to proactively confirm their decision to
decline charges and to give reasons for it.116) Examples include, in the
federal system, the U.S. Department of Justice’s decision not to bring
charges arising from the events leading up to the financial crisis of
2008 (without any proactive announcement, but defended by highranking DOJ officials in subsequent interviews with the press),117 and
to decline charges against Hillary Clinton for her use of a private email
server to conduct State Department business, in a now infamous public
announcement by then-FBI director James Comey.118 Examples from
state and local prosecutors’ offices include declinations of charges in
cases involving public figures who were the alleged perpetrator or
victim.119
The other way prosecutorial declinations become public is when
previously secret declinations are outed as a result of subsequent
developments. Examples of this sort of disclosure include the New
York District Attorney’s decisions to decline charges against the Trump
family in 2012 for fraud in connection with their management of the
Trump Foundation (a decision exposed by press inquiries following
Donald Trump’s pursuit and ultimate ascension to the presidency),

http://files.suffolkdistrictattorney.com/The-Rachael-Rollins-Policy-Memo.pdf [https://
perma.cc/W7QZ-BDME]; Limitations: Declination Rate Cannot Be Calculated, Philadelphia
District Attorney’s Office, https://data.philadao.com/limitations.html [https://perma.cc
/AF5V-YPV6]. Assessment of follow-through is particularly important given divergences
that can arise between politically-accountable lead prosecutors and the career civil servants
tasked with executing policy changes. See Lauren M. Ouziel, Democracy, Bureaucracy, and
Criminal Justice Reform, 61 B.C. L. REV. 523, 555–63 (2020).
116 See Roth, supra note 105.
117 William D. Cohan, How Wall Street’s Bankers Stayed Out of Jail, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/how-wall-streets-bankersstayed-out-of-jail/399368/ [https://perma.cc/5FTS-4BP9].
118 Marc Landler & Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I. Director James Comey Recommends No Charges
for Hillary Clinton on Email, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07
/06/us/politics/hillary-clinton-fbi-email-comey.html [https://perma.cc/UJ3Y-VMH2].
119 See, e.g., Kevin Draper, No Charges for Cristiano Ronaldo in Las Vegas Sexual Assault
Case, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/22/sports/nocharges-for-cristiano-ronaldo-in-las-vegas-rape-case.html [https://perma.cc/578R-C55C];
James Halpin, Prosecutors Decline Charges over Swastika Note Sent to Jewish Lawmaker, CITIZENS
VOICE (Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.citizensvoice.com/news/prosecutors-decline-chargesover-swastika-note-sent-to-jewish-lawmaker/article_7db7e6f1-0789-5288-8e013f44cc2f2774.html [https://perma.cc/25EG-DPXN].
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and against Harvey Weinstein in 2015 for sexual assault (later exposed
by reporting arising out of other sexual assault and harassment
allegations that surfaced in 2017).120 A notorious example from the
federal system was the secret nonprosecution agreement entered into
between Jeffrey Epstein and the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Southern
District of Florida, which remained under seal for eight years until
Epstein’s victims got a court to unseal it—and did not garner public
attention until the U.S. Attorney who negotiated and signed the
agreement, Alex Acosta, was nominated to a position in President
Trump’s cabinet.121 More broadly, the #MeToo movement inspired a
series of victims to go public about allegations of sexual assaults that
were ultimately never prosecuted.122
Examples of publicly visible enforcement declinations are the rare
exception, not the rule. A common denominator in each of these
examples is intense media interest: declinations were made public only
because the press—and therefore the public—was paying attention to
the events leading to the investigation and ultimate decision not to
charge. But prosecutors likely decline tens of thousands of cases at
least per year,123 almost all of which occur entirely out of public view.
This has important implications for accountability and public trust.

120 Jeannie Suk Gersen, Why Didn’t the Manhattan D.A. Cyrus Vance Prosecute the Trumps
or Harvey Weinstein?, NEW YORKER (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news
/news-desk/why-didnt-manhattan-da-cyrus-vance-prosecute-the-trumps-or-harvey-weinstein
[https://perma.cc/NJA4-PVJD].
121 See Marc Fisher, Labor Nominee Acosta Cut Deal with Billionaire Guilty in Sex Abuse Case,
WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/labor-nomineeacosta-cut-deal-with-billionaire-in-sex-abuse-case-involving-40-underage-girls/2017/03/21
/d33271a8-0d85-11e7-ab07-07d9f521f6b5_story.html
[https://perma.cc/7J3S-9CGR].
Public insight into the full scope of the evidence underlying the declined charges did not
come until a Miami Herald reporter decided, following Acosta’s confirmation hearings, to
speak to Epstein’s victims. See Tiffany Hsu, The Jeffrey Epstein Case Was Cold, Until a Miami
Herald Reporter Got Accusers to Talk, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com
/2019/07/09/business/media/miami-herald-epstein.html
[https://perma.cc/2HN7BLN7].
122 See Gene Maddaus, Many Accused, None Prosecuted: Why #MeToo Hasn’t Led to a Single
Criminal Charge in L.A., VARIETY (Sept. 25, 2018), https://variety.com/2018/biz/news
/metoo-legal-los-angeles-criminal-charges-1202955008/ [https://perma.cc/EC4N-PSBF].
These echoed episodic reports of underenforcement of sexual assault offenses—reports
based on rare, isolated access to declination data. See, e.g., Spohn & Tellis, supra note 113,
at 404; supra note 114. See generally Deborah Tuerkheimer, Underenforcement as Unequal
Protection, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1287, 1292–99 (reviewing the studies).
123 See Roth, supra note 105, at 479–80, 480 n.6 (“In an era of expansive criminal law
and finite government resources, declinations constitute an ever more significant piece of
the criminal justice picture, even if the precise size of that piece is unknown,” citing to
selected studies estimating anywhere from four percent to fifty percent of cases referred to
prosecutors are declined, varying by jurisdiction and offense classification.).
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Consider the effect on the public’s evaluative capacity. The small
set of public declinations is subject to selection bias: only in unusual
circumstances, and typically only because of those circumstances, do
declination decisions become public. This bias skews the public
“data,” crippling the public’s ability to gauge the quality of law
enforcement decisionmaking. When selected declinations in cases of
intense public interest are aired without broader context, evidencebased evaluations are effectively impossible. The public is left to
speculate as to whether these declinations were merited based on the
evidence, and if not, whether the breakdown is an isolated occurrence
or evidence of broader dysfunction.
Secret declinations also enable enforcers to shift blame for their
decisions—and for crime fluctuations more broadly—to other
institutional actors. When it declined to charge banks and bank
executives following the 2008 crisis, the Department of Justice placed
some of the blame on Congress, arguing that the federal fraud laws
placed a too-high burden for proving scienter.124 (Do they? Without
access to the evidence prosecutors reviewed, it is impossible to
know.125) When, in 2019, homicides in Philadelphia rose sharply over
the prior year, the police commissioner blamed the district attorney
for bringing fewer prosecutions of firearms offenses even as the police
arrested more firearms offenders; in turn, the district attorney claimed
his office had pursued a higher share of cases in which a gun charge
was the most serious charge, even as it declined more gun cases
overall.126 The entire debate, meanwhile, relied on data hidden from
the public—and that appeared not even to have been fully compiled

124 See Cohan, supra note 117.
125 Indeed, the absence of public evidence fueled a debate relatively light on facts and
heavy on speculation, even as the debaters themselves acknowledged their informational
deficits. See, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been
Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. (Jan. 9, 2014), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09
/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/?lp_txn_id=1003391
[https://perma.cc
/578Q-AC92] (acknowledging no inside knowledge as to the evidence in any particular
case, but arguing that the Department of Justice’s excuses for the lack of any criminal
charges “appear unconvincing”); Samuel W. Buell, Is the White Collar Offender Privileged?, 63
DUKE L.J. 823, 846–54 (2014) (assessing legal hurdles to proving criminal fraud in the
context of events leading to the financial crisis, arguing absence of evidence in the public
domain sufficient to prove guilt—“nowhere has anyone described the particular evidence
that could be used in these cases to prove any individual’s specific intent to defraud”—
indicates such evidence did not exist).
126 Chris Palmer, After Weekend Shootings, Philly DA Larry Krasner Defends His Office’s
Record on Gun Cases, PHILA. INQUIRER (June 18, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news
/larry-krasner-district-attorney-philadelphia-gun-prosecutions-richard-ross-20190618.html
[https://perma.cc/LR4B-DZ2P].
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by the enforcement agencies themselves.127 This dynamic has echoed
in districts throughout the country, where police departments have
blamed rising violent crime on the declination decisions of self-styled
progressive prosecutors, while those prosecutors in turn defend their
decisions as a more targeted and effective approach to crime—all in
the absence of publicly accessible data on declinations.128
As with targeting data, the absence of declination data afflicts
enforcers themselves. A significant portion of prosecutors’ offices do
not collect data on their own selection processes. A recent study by the
Urban Institute found that only about two-thirds of sampled
prosecutors’ offices collected data on arrests and declinations, and
eighty-four percent collected data on case referrals.129 In offices that
do not internally track decisionmaking, then, a prosecutor seeking
guidance on whether to charge, or a supervisor seeking to give
guidance, lacks evidence-based institutional knowledge. “How we do
it” would at most capture individual experience and anecdote rather
than systematic data. Research has shown that, when it comes to
declinations, a prosecutor’s office’s data collection practices can have
profound impacts on consistency and fairness in prosecutorial
decisionmaking.130

127 Id. (Krasner’s “office said a full set of data about gun-related prosecutions—such as
the number of cases prosecuted, declined, and outcomes of those cases over a period of
several years—would take more time to gather. . . . [Commissioner] Ross did not offer
specifics on whether the Police Department had found definitive patterns of cases being
dropped or ending with a figurative slap on the wrist. He said the department was studying
gun-related cases and their progression through the criminal justice system to learn more
about potential trends.”).
128 See Mark Berman, These Prosecutors Won Office Vowing to Fight the System. Now, the
System Is Fighting Back, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/national/these-prosecutors-won-office-vowing-to-fight-the-system-now-the-system-isfighting-back/2019/11/05/20d863f6-afc1-11e9-a0c9-6d2d7818f3da_story.html [https://
perma.cc/P7M8-CNTM].
129 ROBIN OLSEN, LEIGH COURTNEY, CHLOE WARNBERG & JULIE SAMUELS, URB. INST.,
COLLECTING AND USING DATA FOR PROSECUTORIAL DECISIONMAKING: FINDINGS FROM 2018
NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE PROSECUTORS’ OFFICES 6 (Sept. 2018). The study surveyed 158
prosecutors’ offices, divided roughly equally in terms of district population (twenty-five
offices in large districts (population greater than one million); twenty-eight in mediumlarge (population between 500,000–999,999); thirty-two in medium (population between
250,000–499,999); thirty-five in medium-small (population between 100,000–249,999); and
thirty-eight in small (population less than 99,999). Id. at 4. While the smallest offices
consistently had the lowest share of data collected, the highest share of collected data was
distributed inconsistently across office size; for instance, medium-sized offices had the
highest share of collected data on case declinations (eighty-four percent), while the largest
offices had the highest share of collected data on arrest charges (seventy-seven percent).
Id. at 7.
130 See FREDERICK & STEMEN, supra note 113, at 14–15 (in study of declination decisions
in two offices, in which researchers interviewed prosecutors about declination reasoning,
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Here, then, is the cycle. Law enforcement does not make public—
nor, in many instances, are enforcers even aware of—declination
decisions and patterns or the reasons for them. Isolated public
disclosures of declinations in high-profile cases—typically, cases in
which the decision was controversial, unpopular, or otherwise
noteworthy—generate critiques to which enforcers cannot effectively
respond in the absence of broader context on case selection. Public
distrust grows. In turn, enforcers seek to mitigate distrust by shifting
blame to other institutional actors (legislators, courts, or even other
enforcement institutions) or by citing to data—invisible to the public,
and in some instances unclear to enforcers themselves—they claim
supports their selection decisions. Public trust ebbs further.
B. Transparency
Not all decisionmaking in criminal enforcement is secret. Much,
in fact, is public, particularly at the post-charging stage. But in the
context of the full scope of enforcers’ decisionmaking, partial
transparency presents underappreciated harms.
One is deceptiveness. Public data—both at the pre- and postcharging stages—reflects and incorporates earlier, nonpublic decisions. Yet because those earlier decisions are invisible, policy makers
and researchers can be deceived as to the source of undesirable
outcomes—reaching conclusions, and advocating actions, that may
not ultimately mitigate those outcomes and might even exacerbate
them.
The other key harm of partial transparency is its deleterious
effects on enforcement. Because criminal procedure’s existing
allocation of public and private makes visible criminal enforcement
outputs rather than the processes that lead to them, it incentivizes undesirable—even unreasonable—exercises of enforcement discretion.
Subsection 1 discusses the first problem, and subsection 2 the
second. Subsection 3 shows how these two harms perpetuate one
another.

finding significant within-office decisional variation that could not be explained by
differences in evidential strength, case type, or other predictive factors); Miller & Wright,
supra note 14, at 162–66 (recounting how, following a Vera Institute pilot program tracking
case declinations across three prosecutors’ offices, one office was able to identify the
existence of racial disparities in declinations of marijuana prosecutions along with their
source—evaluation of crime seriousness varying by office tenure—and to rectify those
disparities by training new prosecutors to more readily decline marijuana possession drug
cases).
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1. Deceptiveness
Envision criminal enforcers’ decisionmaking along a timeline. At
the beginning, there is the decision to target a particular geographic
area or category of offense conduct. Further along the timeline is the
decision to engage in investigative activity, from relatively less intrusive
activities (such as consensual interviews) to the most intrusive
(searches and wiretaps). Further along still is the decision to arrest an
offender. After that, the decision to charge (whether to charge, and if
so, with what statutory offenses). Following the charging decision
comes the decision of how to resolve the case—whether by plea
bargain (in effect, a decision to accept a particular sentence or
sentencing range), trial or, should circumstances merit, dismissal.
Finally is the sentencing stage where, in the absence of a plea bargain,
enforcers decide what sentence or sentencing range to advocate.
Only the end stages of this timeline—beginning with the decision
to charge—are visible to the public. (Some earlier decisions, such as
searches or arrests, will become visible after a case is charged; but those
decisions are only visible in charged cases, and then only in those
charged cases where earlier decisions are challenged.) Crucially, the
end-stage, public-facing decisions are products of the earlier,
nonpublic decisions.
And yet the public, policymakers, and
researchers are forced to overlook the influence of those nonpublic
stages of the process on the system’s public outputs.
Consider, as an example, the debate around racial disparities in
federal sentencing. Among American criminal court systems, the
federal system offers perhaps the most comprehensive, publicly
available collection of data, compiled across two branches of
government.131 But the very richness of this data collection obscures
critical holes. Decades of research by the United States Sentencing
Commission on the impact of sentencing guidelines and penal statutes
on racial disparities in sentencing has failed to consider the potential
causal effects of pre-charging decisions by law enforcement agents and
charging decisions by prosecutors.132 The absence of data on racial
disparities in pre-charging and charging decisions is not evidence of
absence, particularly given the dearth of data generally on these stages

131 The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, the Department of Justice, and the
Sentencing Commission each keep detailed records on cases and individual defendants,
from filing to sentencing. In fact, the relative bounty of adjudicative data in federal criminal
cases, as compared to state and local ones, has drawn a level of scholarly attention far
exceeding the federal system’s relative significance. See Daniel Richman, Judging Untried
Cases, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 219, 222 (2007).
132 See Starr & Rehavi, supra note 20, at 49–52 (critiquing Sentencing Commission for
this omission).
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of the process. Yet by ignoring the potential effects of earlier-stage
decisions on sentencing outcomes, the Sentencing Commission has
effectively treated it this way.
Even scholars who have attempted to correct for this critical
omission, by taking into account arrest and charging data, have come
up against data collection constraints that severely limit causal
conclusions. The most thorough empirical study on racial disparities
in federal sentencing in the post-Booker133 era sought to analyze the
sentencing effects of initial charging decisions, yet was forced to omit
the single offense category for which racial sentencing disparities have
been most pronounced—drug offenses—because charging-stage data
on drug type and quantity in federal drug cases (the most important
contributing variable in drug sentencing) is unavailable.134 And as the
study’s authors admit, they were constrained by the absence of any data
on pre-charging decisions by law enforcement agents.135 Yet charging
decisions in drug cases, and pre-charging decisions in all federal
criminal cases, may have potentially robust causal effects on racial
disparities in sentencing—some though processes imperceptible to
enforcers themselves.136 What’s more, given the federal system’s heavy

133 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 222 (2005), made the previously mandatory
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines merely advisory, giving federal judges discretion to sentence
outside the Guidelines’ recommended ranges.
134 See Starr & Rehavi, supra note 20, at 26 (“[I]n drug cases, the ambiguities [in
charging data] were too extreme to resolve . . . most cases were charged under omnibus
provisions (such as 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)) encompassing all drug types and quantities. We
could not meaningfully code the severity of such provisions, and thus cannot assess initial
charging disparities in drug cases.”). For drug cases, then, the authors were only able to
analyze racial disparities in the use of mandatory-minimum-bearing charges. Id.
135 Id. at 35 & n.111.
136 Id. at 35. (“[R]ecorded arrest offenses will be affected by law enforcement choices.
This is a key limitation of our strategy of controlling for the arrest offense. . . . Nor do our
estimates capture sample selection introduced by police decisions that determine who lands
in the federal criminal justice system at all.”). Recent litigation challenging racial disparities
in federal drug stash house sting cases in Chicago, which carried enormously high
sentencing guidelines ranges, sheds light on the ways in which racial sentencing disparities
can flow from seemingly minor pre-charging decisions. See United States v. Brown, 299 F.
Supp. 3d 976 (N.D. Ill. 2018). Because the initial targets of the sting operation themselves
recruited co-participants (who comprised the vast majority of the defendants), see id. at
1004, the racial makeup of the participants overwhelmingly mirrored the initial target’s
race—a pattern familiar to sociologists. See, e.g., Thomas A. DiPrete, Andrew Gelman, Tyler
McCormick, Julien Teitler & Tian Zheng, Segregation in Social Networks Based on
Acquaintanceship and Trust, 116 AM. J. SOCIO. 1234, 1269 (2011) (studying patterns of
segregation in social networks, concluding “trust networks in the United States remain
highly [racially] segregated,” with study participants reporting far greater numbers of
trusted persons among those in their own racial group). The initial targets, moreover, were
introduced to the federal agents by confidential informants. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 1004.
Thus, it was the selection of the confidential informants, a process perhaps even unconnected
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reliance on local law enforcement authorities to bring cases, the blind
spot goes even deeper: antecedent decisions by local enforcers (both
police and prosecutors) influence federal enforcers’ charging and
declination decisions in ways at once profound and, to the outside
observer, entirely invisible.137
Or consider the debate over the so-called “trial penalty,” so
named for the observed phenomenon in which a criminal defendant
who goes to trial receives a harsher sentence than a similarly situated
defendant who pleads guilty.138 Some researchers conclude the
observed phenomenon is real—that all else being equal, defendants
who go to trial receive a higher sentence than those who plead guilty—
and is caused by the choice to go to trial.139 Others conclude the observed phenomenon is not real but instead a product of unaccountedfor variables such as case severity or evidential strength, and that absent
those confounding variables the relationship between sentence
severity and choice of adjudicative mechanism is actually the inverse: a
defendant who pleads guilty receives a longer sentence than a similarly
situated defendant who goes to trial.140
All of these studies suffer from a key limitation: sourcing
sentencing differentials from sentencing data can be deceiving,
because those datasets do not reflect the antecedent enforcement
decisions that determined the counts of conviction. It is impossible to
tell, based on sentencing data alone, whether two similarly situated
cases are in fact so, or whether seeming similarities are merely artifacts
to the stash house sting cases, that appears to have had a cascading racial effect on those
cases.
137 For instance, in the stash house sting litigation discussed above, see supra note 136,
the selection criteria for federal prosecution relied heavily on a criminal history of violent
and weapons offenses, crime categories in which blacks were over-represented relative to
non-blacks. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 1012. This overrepresentation could well reflect
racial bias along any of the steps in the process that led to those convictions, a possibility
the Court observed. Id. at 1012 n.33. In fact, for most federal cases criminal history is a key
selection criterion, one that ends up replicating local enforcement patterns and
exacerbating their effects.
138 See Brian D. Johnson, Plea-Trial Differences in Federal Punishment: Research and Policy
Implications, 31 FED. SENT’G REP. 256 (2019) (summarizing the research).
139 See, e.g., id. at 257; Brian D. Johnson, Trials and Tribulations: The Trial Tax and the
Process of Punishment, 48 CRIME & JUST. 313, 313 (2019) (concluding trial conviction
increases the odds of incarceration by two to six times and produces sentence lengths that
are fifteen to sixty percent longer than a guilty plea).
140 See David S. Abrams, Is Pleading Really a Bargain?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 200,
218 (2011) (after controlling for selection effects including case type and seriousness,
concluding that empirical data shows “no evidence of a ‘trial penalty’” but instead “longer
expected sentences from plea bargaining”); see also Douglas A. Smith, The Plea Bargaining
Controversy, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 949, 966 (1986) (concluding the expected
unconditional likelihood after trial is statistically indistinguishable from that after a plea
bargain).
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of earlier discretionary decisions—such as the decision to charge more
aggressively in one case and less in another; or to offer, pre-arrest, a
chance at cooperation in one case and not the other; or to negotiate,
pre-filing, as to the potential charges to which a defendant will plead
guilty.141 Nor is it possible to assess the many factual distinctions
between cases that surely impact sentencing length, yet remain
invisible to outside observers. For instance, two defendants with
similar criminal histories convicted of second-degree robbery may
receive quite different sentences depending on the use of a weapon
and the weapon type, the degree of force or threat, the characteristics
of the victim, and so forth and so on—facts that, in pled cases, typically
are documented (if at all) only in a pre-sentence report that remains
under court seal. When researchers lack insight into critical determinants of sentence length, it is difficult to agree upon the existence, let
alone causes, of observed sentencing disparities.
These examples are not offered to criticize researchers who make
good faith efforts in the face of data constraints. They are instead
offered to highlight the extent to which partial transparency impedes
the corrective efforts of even its most sophisticated consumers. The
less sophisticated consumers—the media, the public, and policymakers—lack the capacity to appreciate the important limitations of
partially transparent data, leading to facile conclusions that may
misapprehend a problem’s true source.
Prescriptions to reduce racial disparities in federal sentencing, for
instance, have ranged from reducing judicial discretion142 to reducing
prosecutorial discretion,143 with no attention to the role of law
enforcement agents and agencies (both federal and state and local) in
the targeting of suspects and offenses—despite some evidence of
targeting practices that have inadvertently produced racial disparities
in the few federal cases where such data has been disclosed.144
Espousers of the trial penalty thesis conclude that prosecutors’ pleabargaining practices have eroded defendants’ trial rights. But a
defendant’s choice of adjudicative mechanism may be influenced less
141 A rare opportunity to analyze the sentencing effects of pre-filing charge bargaining
was provided to researchers by the New York County District Attorney’s Office, which made
available for purposes of the research otherwise nonpublic pre-filing data. The resulting
study found forty-one percent of defendants had charges reduced between arrest and filing,
and a twelve percent reduction in the probability of incarceration based on pre-filing charge
reductions. See Brian D. Johnson & Pilar Larroulet, The “Distance Traveled”: Investigating the
Downstream Consequences of Charge Reductions for Disparities in Incarceration, 36 JUST. Q. 1229,
1239, 1243 (2019).
142 See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 19, at 8–9.
143 See Starr & Rehavi, supra note 20, at 78.
144 See Siegler & Admussen, supra note 11, at 1025; supra notes 136–37 and
accompanying text (discussing United States v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d 976 (2018)).
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by plea bargaining than by earlier enforcement decisions (such as on
the severity of the charge or an offer of cooperation); alternatively,
sentencing differentials may be a function of real, yet invisible,
differences between tried and untried cases. If so, it is far from clear
that observed sentencing differentials are a problem at all, let alone
one for which plea bargaining is to blame.
In short, partial transparency’s deceptions have cascading
effects—on the identification of a problem, its diagnosis, and
prescriptions for its cure. It is the social science equivalent of offering
a single answer to an indeterminate algebraic equation; without more
information on the unknown variables, it is impossible to know if that
answer is the correct one.145
2. Incentives
As Subsection 1 showed, partial transparency offers an incomplete
picture of enforcement decisionmaking and its downstream effects.
But the problem is not merely the incompleteness of the picture. It is
also the image created by which portions of the total picture we see—
and how the image, and enforcers’ awareness of it, influences
enforcement decisionmaking.
That image is a collection of enforcement outputs: how many
reported crimes result in an arrest (the so-called clearance rate); how
many are arrested overall, and for which crimes; how many are
charged; how many are convicted, and by what means (guilty plea or
trial); how many are sentenced to imprisonment, and for how long.146
An output is a function of what state agents do: for enforcers, that
means making arrests, filing charges, and securing convictions.147
Outcomes, on the other hand, are a function of what state agents
achieve.148 For criminal enforcement, achievement might be measured,
145 HUA LOO KENG, INTRODUCTION TO NUMBER THEORY 276 (Peter Shiu trans., 1982).
146 Arrest data is compiled and reported by the FBI though the Uniform Crime
Reporting Program National Incident Based Reporting System. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM NATIONAL INCIDENT-BASED REPORTING SYSTEM:
ARRESTEES (2019). The courts of each jurisdiction in the United States keep and report
basic data on criminal case processing, including charges and dispositions. Some also keep
and report data on sentences imposed, as do state sentencing commissions. The
Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics compiles and periodically reports
aggregate state sentencing data (the most recent report, however, was in 2009). See National
Judicial Reporting Program (NJRP), BUREAU JUST. STAT., https://bjs.ojp.gov/data-collection
/national-judicial-reporting-program-njrp#publications-0
[https://perma.cc/X99TTHH4] (Dec. 2009). Of course, because sentencings occur in open court and are recorded
in the case record, sentencing data for any given case is publicly available on request.
147 See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY
THEY DO IT 113–20 (1989).
148 See id.
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most obviously, as reductions in crime. Generally, though, we lack
reliable data on crime prevalence. We have some data on reported
crimes,149 but we do not know the true prevalence of “victimless”
crime—a large category that includes drug offenses, certain gun
offenses, and many financial and other white-collar crimes. Because
of this, we lack ways to measure criminal enforcement’s efficacy in a
given space: absent current enforcement levels and priorities, would
criminal activity be less, more, or about the same? This is the key policy
question criminal enforcement presents; yet in most instances,
policymakers are unequipped to answer it.
Criminal enforcement, then, is a textbook example of the
dynamic behavioral economists, public administration scholars, and
organization theorists have observed in a variety of contexts: we seek
to measure what we value, but we come to value what we measure.150
Those subject to the measure, moreover, will endeavor to meet it—
even if the measure does not always align with the larger mission. Why
do police focus on making arrests,151 and why do prosecutors focus on
charging cases for which they can obtain convictions?152 For the same
reason CEOs focus on stock price,153 public school teachers focus on
standardized test scores154 and political leaders focus on Gross
Domestic Product,155 notwithstanding that these metrics do not
necessarily align with corporate success, educational attainment, and
economic wellbeing.
In criminal enforcement, the combination of public performance
metrics and nonpublic decisionmaking creates an even greater

149

See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM, CRIME
UNITED STATES (2019) https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2019/preliminaryreport/home [https://perma.cc/FN6G-GYLR].
150 DONELLA MEADOWS, INDICATORS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT 2 (1998) (“Not only do we measure what we value, we also come to value
what we measure.”); see also Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the
Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 1, 12 n.30 (2009) (collecting
citations for the general principle across various fields).
151 EDITH LINN, ARREST DECISIONS: WHAT WORKS FOR THE OFFICER (2009).
152 Bibas, supra note 13.
153 Dan Ariely, You Are What You Measure, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 2010).
154 Brian A. Jacob & Steven D. Levitt, Rotten Apples: An Investigation of the Prevalence and
Predictors of Teacher Cheating, 118 Q.J. ECON. 843 (2003).
155 JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, AMARTYA SEN & JEAN-PAUL FITOUSSI, REPORT BY THE
COMMISSION ON THE MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND SOCIAL PROGRESS 8–
9 (2009) (“[O]ne of the reasons why the [2008 financial] crisis took many by surprise is
that our measurement system failed us . . . . [P]erhaps had there been more awareness of
the limitations of standard metrics, like GDP, there would have been less euphoria over
economic performance in the years prior to the crisis . . . . But many countries lack a timely
and complete set of wealth accounts—the ‘balance sheets’ of the economy—that could give
a comprehensive picture of assets, debts and liabilities of the main actors in the economy.”).
IN THE
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accountability challenge. Consider an example discussed earlier, the
declination of federal criminal charges arising from the 2008 financial
crisis. Public criticism led DOJ leaders to explain their decision as a
product of evidentiary insufficiency.156 A public performance measure
(obtaining convictions) was thus invoked to explain the declination of
charges. And yet, because their decision-making process remains
secret, there is no way to measure prosecutors’ actual performance—
in the conduct of the investigations themselves (were there missed
opportunities to obtain evidence?) or the decision to decline prosecution (were convictions in fact unobtainable?).
Consider, as well, the flip side of declination, targeting. A number
of studies have revealed a charging bias in favor of relatively lower-level
cases within an enforcement space.157 This phenomenon is explained,
in part, by the public metrics by which prosecutors are measured
(indictments and convictions), and the pressure to meet them by
pursuing lower-hanging fruit—cases that are, generally speaking,
easier to bring and easier to win.158 Yet the phenomenon is also a
product of what is not public. We can count the crimes disrupted, but
not the criminal activity that continued unimpeded; we see the
defendants arrested, charged, convicted, and sentenced, but not the
targets of enforcement activity who evaded apprehension, or whom
enforcers simply chose not to target in the first place.
The combination, then, of visible enforcement outputs (arrests,
indictments, convictions, and sentences) and invisible enforcement
outcomes (actual reductions of crime in a given enforcement space)
incentivizes enforcers to meet visible output metrics while
disincentivizing consideration of how those efforts fit within the larger
mission of crime reduction. This dynamic, of partial transparency
impeding accountability, has been observed in a variety of principalagent contexts outside criminal enforcement, including financial

156 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
157 See, e.g., Ouziel, supra note 97 (federal drug enforcement); Urska Velikonja,
Reporting Agency Performance: Behind the SEC’s Enforcement Statistics, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 901,
904 (2016) (federal securities fraud enforcement); Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private
Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1404
(1998) (federal housing and employment discrimination).
158 See Ouziel, supra note 97, at 1098–99 (discussing generally inverse relationship
between a defendant’s relative culpability and proximity to evidence of guilt).
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portfolio management,159 healthcare,160 and public policymaking.161 In
each instance, public visibility into outputs coupled with invisibility
into outcomes produces suboptimal agent performance.162
3. A Self-Perpetuating Spiral
Now consider how these two harms of partial transparency
perpetuate each other. Output-based evaluative metrics incentivize
enforcers to meet those metrics rather than to make enforcement
choices that will improve criminal justice outcomes over the longer
term. At the same time, the absence of metrics focused on the critical
earlier stages of the process effectively immunizes enforcers from
accountability at those key stages, further incentivizing enforcers to
make early-stage decisions with an eye primarily to their later-stage
result.
In practical terms, this means a law enforcement agent is
incentivized to target spaces in which it is easier to access evidence,
regardless of whether those spaces present the greatest criminal threats
to society. It means an agent is incentivized to make arrest decisions
based primarily on evidential strength rather than considerations such
as the relative severity of offense conduct or the relative culpability of
an offender. It means a prosecutor will make charging decisions
primarily based on ability to convict rather than the importance of a
case or defendant within a given criminal ecosystem and, in turn, the
effects of that criminal ecosystem on society. Finally, it means that the
public cannot see those decisions, probe their bases, or hold enforcers
accountable for them.

159 Josef Lakonishok, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Structure and Performance
of the Money Management Industry, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY:
MICROECONOMICS 1992, at 339–79 (Martin Neil Baily & Clifford Winston eds., 1992)
(explaining underperformance of pension funds as compared to mutual funds in part by
greater transparency of investment decisions by pension fund manager agents and oversight
by their corporate principals).
160 David Dranove, Daniel Kessler, Mark McClellan & Mark Satterthwaite, Is More
Information Better? The Effects of “Report Cards” on Health Care Providers, 111 J. POL. ECON. 555,
572–77 (2003) (finding “report cards” reduced positive health outcomes and increased
costs for coronary bypass surgery candidates in two states where they were implemented,
due in large part to their effects on doctors’ selection of patients (healthier patients and
higher quantities of surgeries became favored)).
161 See, e.g., Justin Fox, Government Transparency and Policymaking, 131 PUB. CHOICE 23
(2007) (discussing how transparency harms accountability in situations where lawmakers
have more information than constituents); Prat, supra note 17 (discussing same in context
of agency policymaking, where career civil servants have greater information and expertise
than their political overseers).
162 This dynamic is discussed in greater detail below in Section III.A.
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REALLOCATING SECRECY AND TRANSPARENCY

The boundary criminal procedure sets between secrecy and
transparency in criminal enforcement no longer serves its original
animating purpose, the constraint of unreasonable exercise of
enforcement power. Today’s boundary is a relic of an earlier time, in
which transparency at the later stages of the criminal process effectively
limited enforcement overreach. With the advent of professionalized
policing and prosecution and the growth of regulatory crimes, the
greatest risk of overreach now comes at the earlier stages of the
criminal process—when professional enforcers determine which
offenses and suspects to target, whom to charge, and with what crimes.
It is past time to redraw the boundary between secrecy and
transparency in the criminal process. But how? Any new boundary
must reconcile two key challenges. First is the inherent tension
between secrecy and transparency in the criminal process. Some
secrecy is necessary to ensure the presumption of innocence and the
integrity of the investigative process. Secrecy, then, must be precisely
targeted to achieve those ends, while taking care not to shield
enforcers from accountability for their choices. The second key
challenge is potential adverse effects of transparency on enforcers’
decisionaking. As previewed above,163 not all forms of transparency
generate improvements in decisionmaking or greater accountability.
Sustained attention must be given to what forms of transparency will
best generate positive responses.
That early-stage secrecy has persisted, despite its heavy costs, is
perhaps indicative of the scope of the challenge. Calibrating transparency in the early stages of the criminal process is hard; there are no
ideal solutions, only tradeoffs. This Part envisions a set of tradeoffs to
improve upon the status quo, drawing on lessons from outside criminal
enforcement to provide a blueprint for within it. Section A lays out
those lessons and their application to criminal enforcement, and
Section B considers responsive changes.
A. What Type of Transparency?
Recent work in political economy has converged on a counterintuitive conclusion: transparency does not necessarily generate
greater accountability. In certain situations, public exposure can
actually corrupt the decisions of public officials, incentivizing actions
that appear to be in the principal’s interest but in fact are not.

163

See supra notes 150–55 and 159–61.
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Two circumstances typically generate this misaligned incentive
structure. The first is information asymmetry.164 When a principal has
limited access to, or understanding of, the full scope of information at
the agent’s disposal, the principal is unable to evaluate the agent’s
performance effectively. The agent thus takes into consideration the
principal’s informational disadvantage when making decisions on
which she will be evaluated. The agent is incentivized to make a
decision that, to the underinformed principal, will appear to be the
“right” decision—the decision that confirms the agent’s orientation to
her mission and effectiveness at advancing it—even if the decision is in
fact suboptimal.165
The second circumstance is a principal’s inability to assess the
downstream consequences of an agent’s decision.166 This can occur
because of a temporal delay—the consequences occur too far into the
future—or because consequences are visible only when individual
agent decisions are aggregated over time and place.167
164 See Gersen & Stephenson, supra note 17, at 187 (observing that the “overaccountability problem”—the phenomenon in which accountability mechanisms decrease
the chance an agent acts in the principal’s interest—“is essentially an information problem:
sometimes even a fully rational but imperfectly informed principal (e.g., the citizens) will
reward ‘bad’ actions rather than ‘good’ actions by an agent”); see also Jonathan Fox, The
Uncertain Relationship Between Transparency and Accountability, 17 DEV. PRAC. 663, 667 (2007)
(observing that transparency cannot generate accountability when it is “opaque”—meaning
the information disseminated “does not reveal how institutions actually behave in
practice . . . in terms of how they make decisions” or “is divulged only nominally, or . . . is
revealed but turns out to be unreliable”).
165 Gersen and Stephenson illustrate by reference to a regulator for the Department
of Transportation who must decide whether to require a particular regulation on
automobile manufacturers. Assuming the Pareto optimal status is no regulation but only
the agent has the expertise and information to understand why this is so, the agent is
incentivized to regulate in order to demonstrate to the underinformed principal (her
political overseer), that she is not captured by the automobile industry. Gersen &
Stephenson, supra note 17, at 192. Similarly, Justin Fox posits the same dynamic with
respect to elected officials attempting to demonstrate unbiased motivations to constituents:
“the voter’s attempt to weed out biased politicians from the pool of office holders leads
reelection oriented incumbents to select policy one . . . even when they know policy one is
inappropriate . . . . As a result . . . transparency weakens incumbent discipline, potentially
lowering the voter’s welfare vis-á-vis a situation where policy is determined behind closed
doors.” Fox, supra note 161, at 33.
166 See Prat, supra note 17, at 868–69 (finding that when the principal cannot observe
the consequence of an agent’s action, the agent is “tempted to try to fool the principal by
playing the action that corresponds to the smart consequence” even if the action would in
fact generate a poor consequence); see also Fox, supra note 164, at 667 (noting that
transparency will not generate accountability if institutions’ “dissemination of
information . . . does not reveal . . . the results of their actions”).
167 Prat offers as an example of the former situation a large-scale public project such
as healthcare reform, for which effects on health outcomes may only be measurable many
years (or even decades) hence. Prat, supra note 17, at 868–69. An example of the later is
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These two harbingers of underaccountability—the principal’s
informational deficit relative to the agent, and the principal’s inability
to assess downstream consequences—map quite neatly onto criminal
enforcement. The public (the principal) has visibility into enforcers’
(the agents’) actions in the early stages of the criminal process—the
decision to arrest and to charge—but, because it lacks access to the
legal and factual context of those decisions, it is at an informational
disadvantage to evaluate the agent. In addition, the public cannot
assess the downstream consequences of the agents’ decisions—on
crime prevalence and societal well-being—because the societal effects
of criminal enforcement play out over decades, a function of aggregate
enforcement decisions over time and place. The effects of the broken
windows approach to policing in the 1990s, for instance, or the
increase in felony case filings in the early 2000s, or the charging of
offenses carrying long mandatory minimum imprisonment terms only
became visible to the broader public years later, after millions of
individual enforcement actions.
But there is a flip side. Transparency can increase accountability
when it is designed to reduce information asymmetry between principal and agent,168 and to focus less on an agent’s actions and more on
the actions’ consequences.169 The political theorist Jane Mansbridge
has postulated that information asymmetry is best reduced by
increasing “transparency in rationale—in procedures, information,
reasons, and the facts on which the reasons are based” while reducing
“transparency in process (for example making all committee meetings
public).”170 Put differently, transparency works when the scope of
information disseminated collectively elucidates rather than obscures
institutional behavior, and when it focuses less on an institution’s
outputs than its outcomes.

environmental regulation, the effects of which can only be assessed if enforced uniformly
across a given industry. See Fox, supra note 164.
168 Jonathan Fox calls this “clear transparency.” See Fox, supra note 164, at 667–68
(“Clear transparency refers both to information-access policies and to programmes that
reveal reliable information about institutional performance . . . . Clear transparency sheds
light on institutional behaviour . . . . Clear transparency is a form of soft accountability.”); see
also Fox, supra note 161, at 35–36 (“[W]hen both lawmakers and the public know the state
of the world . . . transparency necessarily has the disciplining effects anticipated by
advocates of greater openness in government.”).
169 See Prat, supra note 17, at 868–69 (“We should expect transparency on decisions to
go hand in hand with transparency on consequences. In particular, an action, or the
intention to take an action, should not be revealed before the consequences of the action
are observed.”).
170 Jane Mansbridge, A “Selection Model” of Political Representation, 17 J. POL. PHIL. 369,
386 (2009).
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The next Section considers how these transparency goals might
be accomplished in the criminal enforcement context.
B. Calibrating Secrecy and Transparency in Criminal Procedure
Criminal enforcement presents a unique challenge for curing
informational asymmetry between principal and agent. Protecting the
presumption of innocence, preventing reputational harm, and
ensuring investigative integrity require shrouding some parts of the
pre-charging process from public view. But there are ways to expand
the public’s vision without betraying those commitments. As the
counterintuitive findings on transparency and accountability suggest,
the process requires relaxing secrecy in some respects while
strengthening it in others. This Section illustrates by reference to the
three areas discussed in Section II.A: grand jury secrecy, targeting, and
declination.
1. Grand Jury Secrecy
As subsection II.A.1 showed, while grand jury secrecy rules exist in
theory to protect the presumption of innocence and investigative
integrity, in practice they often simply serve to enlarge prosecutorial
power while diminishing prosecutorial accountability. Simply opening
all grand jury proceedings to public view, however, is not the answer.
As some grand jury investigations into the police killings of black men
have illustrated, publicizing grand jury proceedings will generate
gaming behavior by prosecutors seeking to use the publicized record
to defend their decisionmaking from anticipated criticism.171 This, in
fact, is precisely what the political economy literature teaches will
happen when an agent (here, prosecutors) controls the information
the public can see: more information is not necessarily reliable or
useful information.172
And therein lies the problem of grand jury secrecy: prosecutors
control, for the most part, when evidence heard by the grand jury is
made public and when it remains secret. A more effective approach
would be to remove that element of prosecutorial control. Secrecy
would be mandated, with no opportunity for prosecutors to request
disclosure and no ability to release any evidence presented or expected
to be presented to the grand jury. At the same time, members of the
public—including the media, researchers, civic society organizations,
and of course targets and subjects—could petition the court for
disclosure once the grand jury has either reached a decision on
171
172

See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 159–62 and accompanying text.
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proposed charges (i.e., has returned or not returned an indictment)
or has been discharged by the court without being asked to reach a
decision.
Those public requests, in turn, should be entitled to a strong
presumption in favor of disclosure. Once the grand jury’s work has
concluded, the interest in investigative integrity is substantially
diminished. So, too, the presumption of innocence; the grand jury has
either determined no basis exists for filing charges or has filed charges
which have been made public in any event—and for which the target
remains innocent until proven guilty. And while the potential for
reputational harm remains to those uncharged subjects or targets
against whom evidence was gathered, that risk can be mitigated by
providing those persons an opportunity to be heard on the disclosure
motion. A court can then balance the various competing interests,
taking into account the public importance of the investigation and the
individual reputational effects of disclosure. And if disclosure is
deemed worthwhile, a court can lessen its adverse effects by narrowing
the scope and redacting identifying information as much as possible.
Of course a risk of gaming remains; prosecutors in high-profile
cases may use the grand jury process with an eye to how it will play out
following an anticipated public disclosure request. But such a scenario
is preferable to the status quo, in which prosecutors effectively control
when grand jury matters are made public. By strengthening secrecy
requirements for prosecutors while relaxing them for others in the
post-grand jury phase, criminal procedure can both mitigate
informational asymmetry between enforcers and the public and
reduce enforcers’ ability to leverage that asymmetry to evade
accountability.
2. Targeting and Declination
I consider these issues together because, for prescriptive
purposes, they are flip sides of the same coin. What determines which
crimes, and offenders, enforcers pursue and which they opt to let go?
And do targeting and declination decisions maximize public benefit?
In the language of political economy, the first question addresses the
rationale for decisions, and the second the consequences of them—
both predicates for generating accountability.173 Without a system of
disclosures designed to truly answer these questions, enforcers are
incentivized to make choices that signal enforcement efficacy and
unbiased motivations (“justice without fear or favor”), even when
those choices do not maximize public benefit.

173

See supra notes 168–70 and accompanying text.
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Criminal procedure, then, must find ways to make visible both the
rationale for and consequences of enforcers’ decisions, while
protecting commitment to presumption of innocence, reputational
harm, and investigative integrity. Enforcers clearly cannot publicly
identify targets not pursued, nor can they publicize details of
investigative actions taken (or not taken). But there are other ways to
ensure targeting and declination policies, as well as individual
decisions, are unbiased, effective, and in the public’s best interest.
First, there can be greater transparency as to the rationale for
enforcers’ decisions. Law enforcement agencies should be required to
develop and publicize detailed criteria for critical early-stage decisions
(i.e., to begin an investigation, make an arrest, and file charges). While
others have suggested this idea with respect to charging decisions174—
and some prosecutors in recent years have attempted to standardize
charging criteria to exempt from prosecution certain lower-level
crimes175—we must focus not merely on the decision to charge but also
on the antecedent investigatory decisions that frame that choice. We
also must identify those features of standardized criteria that will
enhance transparency in practice. Federal prosecutors, for example,
have the Department of Justice’s Principles of Federal Prosecution,176
but this hardly functions as a standardizing constraint on federal
prosecutorial discretion or a means of meaningful public visibility into
its exercise.177 To work effectively, investigatory, arrest, and charging
polices must be far more detailed, and particularized as to crime
categories.
The announcements by some chief prosecutors that they will
decline to prosecute certain categories of cases178 is one example of a
public and particularized charging policy. But categorical declinations
of certain low-level offenses are far more straightforward than
discretionary charging decisions in cases outside those categories—
cases in which the public may have a keen interest in ascertaining the
reasons charges were brought in some cases but not in (seemingly
similar) others. The debate in Philadelphia about the causes of ebbing
gun possession prosecutions in a District Attorney’s election year is a
prime example: without data on the criteria for arrests, charges, and
the documented reasons for declined charges, voters are unable to
174 See Miller & Wright, supra note 14.
175 See Berman, supra note 128.
176 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION, 9-27.220–320 (1997)
(on principles governing charging decisions); id. at 9-13.000 et seq. (on obtaining
evidence).
177 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
178 See supra note 115 (discussing publicly announced decisions by the District
Attorneys of Suffolk County, Massachusetts, and Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania).
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interpret prosecutorial trends.179 We need public, particularized
criteria across the full range of offenses, for both prosecutors and
police.
Second, there can be greater transparency into the aggregate of
those early-stage decisions. This could take the form of detailed data
on the use of specific investigatory processes such as the issuance of
subpoenas, nonsearch activities (for instance, physical surveillance or
mail covers), searches, temporary detentions, and arrests. The data
should include nonidentifying demographic information on targets
(age, gender, race, census tract of residence) along with the categories
of crime investigated. For every target ultimately charged, the precharging data should be made public and easily linked, for researching
purposes, to already public case information. Publicizing aggregate
investigative data will allow the public to better see enforcement
patterns, while linking that data to charged cases would allow researchers and policymakers to accurately identify causal relationships across
pre-charging decisions, adjudication and sentencing.
Examples of this sort of data collection and reporting exist, to a
degree, in the few jurisdictions that have utilized third-party monitored
data reporting pursuant to a judicial consent decree.180 Similar
mechanisms could be broadly mandated by laws rather than piecemeal
through litigation—extending across investigatory practices and
following those practices through to final outcomes. Indeed, we
already have a useful model from the healthcare context. The National
Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) was created by Congress to leverage
data disclosure as a tool to reduce medical and dental malpractice.181
The NPDB serves as a clearinghouse for malpractice-related
information for healthcare providers, insurers and researchers—the
latter via bulk data disclosures scrubbed of personal identifiers.182
Of course (as the NPDB experience demonstrates) self-reported
enforcement data can be manipulated and massaged to appear to meet
substantive benchmarks, turning transparency on its head.183 In
179 See supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text.
180 See supra notes 86–91 and accompanying text.
181 For background on the functions of the NPDB and its enabling legislation, see U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK GUIDEBOOK
(2018), https://www.npdb.hrsa.gov/resources/NPDBGuidebook.pdf.
182 See id.; see also Public Use Data File, NAT’L PRACTITIONER DATA BANK (last updated
Feb. 2022), https://www.npdb.hrsa.gov/resources/publicData.jsp [https://perma.cc
/BZ2T-VZE8].
183 See supra note 22 and accompanying text; see also Ouziel, supra note 97 (discussing
the phenomenon in the context of federal drug enforcement); Gabriel H. Teninbaum,
Reforming the National Practitioner Data Bank to Promote Fair Med-Mal Outcomes, 5 WM. & MARY
POL'Y REV. 83, 97–110 (2013) (discussing insurers’ and doctors’ gaming of NPDB-mandated
disclosures and the government’s responses). Teninbaum nevertheless concludes the
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addition, aggregate data disclosures alone cannot capture the nuances,
varieties, and complications of enforcement discretion. This is why
standardizing and reporting early-stage decisionmaking must be
accompanied by a robust system for both monitoring compliance and
digging beneath the data. Scholars have long debated the relative
merits of external and internal oversight for police and prosecutors.184
But neither of these options would be effective at monitoring
decisionmaking at the pre-charging and charging stages. External
evaluation would necessarily rely upon the very self-reporting it would
be tasked with auditing, and would be unable to see behind the
statistics to explore more nuanced questions around enforcement
decisionmaking. Internal monitoring would be hobbled by bias and
capture.
There is a third way. A hybrid approach, combining elements of
external and internal oversight, could mitigate against the weaknesses
of each model. And in fact, there is a ready template for such a hybrid
approach in the context of the federal regulatory state: executive
branch inspectors general (IGs).
Since they were established by statute in 1978,185 IGs have had an
impressive track record at increasing transparency into agency actions
and decisionmaking, even actions and decisions subject to intense
secrecy constraints by law.186 IGs review agency actions through regular
periodic audits of agency performance and financials, inspections of
specific aspects or operations of a program, agency facility or
geographic region, and investigations into alleged wrongdoing.187 The

NPDB serves a valuable transparency function worth keeping, if reformed to tighten and
broaden data gathering. See id. at 110–19.
184 See, e.g., Ellen Yaroshefsky, Foreword: New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure
Obligations: What Really Works?, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1943 (2010) (reviewing options for
external and internal monitoring of prosecutors’ compliance with disclosure obligations);
Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
959 (2009) (reviewing literature prescribing external regulation and critiquing it in favor
of an internal regulatory approach).
185 Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (1978) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. app. 2 (2018)).
186 See Shirin Sinnar, Protecting Rights from Within? Inspectors General and National Security
Oversight, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1059–63 (2013) (discussing how IG investigations of FBI’s
use of National Security Letters, CIA’s interrogation methods, and DOJ’s detention of 9/11
suspects vastly increased transparency into those practices). See generally NADIA HILLIARD,
THE ACCOUNTABILITY STATE: US FEDERAL INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE PURSUIT OF
DEMOCRATIC INTEGRITY (2017); PAUL C. LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS
GENERAL AND THE SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY (1993).
187 See BEN WILHELM, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, STATUTORY INSPECTORS
GENERAL IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: A PRIMER 7–9 (2019).
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reviews are generally initiated either at the IG’s own behest, or in
response to requests by Congress or any other stakeholder.188
Two key features of the IG model make it an effective vehicle for
increasing transparency into areas that necessarily operate out of
public view. First, IGs are embedded in the agencies they oversee,189
with virtually unlimited access to the agency’s records and personnel.190 Agency personnel, in turn, are granted strong protections when
engaging with the IG.191 Second, IGs operate as an “agency within an
agency”—that is, with nearly complete independence from their host
agencies.192 They have their own budget, and are required to alert
Congress if they believe that budget is inadequate.193
They
independently hire their staff and manage their own resources.194
They report their findings both to their host agency and to Congress
and the public.195 They are provided with independent counsel.196
They are appointed subject to Senate confirmation, and if the
President wishes to remove them he or she must inform Congress of
the reasons for removal at least thirty days before removal occurs.197
All of these features have helped to make IGs both independent and
productive investigators across administrations.198 During the Trump
Administration, IGs were subject to enormous political pressure—yet
these features of the model allowed them to mostly withstand it,
offering Congress and the public unvarnished and often pivotal
insights into agency abuses and mismanagement.199
188 Id. at 7.
189 Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 6(d) (2018).
190 Id. § 6(a).
191 Id. § 7.
192 Id. § 6(e)(1)(A).
193 Id. §§ 5(a)(21), 6(g).
194 Id. § 6(a)(7)–(9).
195 Id. §§ 4(a)(5), 4(e), 5.
196 Id. § 3(g).
197 Id. § 3(a)–(b).
198 See Robin J. Kempf & Jessica C. Cabrera, The De Facto Independence of Federal Offices
of Inspector General, 49 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 65 (2019) (in study of IG productivity over
Bush II and Obama administrations, finding no variance in investigative productivity by
administration, slight variance in auditing productivity across administrations, lesser
productivity among IGs in cabinet as opposed to non-cabinet agencies but presidentiallyappointed IGs more productive than those appointed by agency heads).
199 For instance, the Postal Service’s Inspector General’s report on late primary mail
ballots awakened Congress and the public to mismanagement that could threaten the ontime delivery of mail ballots in the general election—and helped to stave off such delays.
See Luke Broadwater, 1 Million Primary Ballots Were Mailed Late, Postal Service Watchdog Says,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/01/us/politics/postalservice-late-ballots.html [https://perma.cc/L36T-AUWV]. Even the enormous political
pressure on State Department IGs investigating their agency’s head, Secretary Pompeo, still
did not prevent them from taking actions that enabled Congress to advance the
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This hybrid model of oversight—internal access coupled with
independence—has generated the right kind of transparency in
government: transparency that levels the information asymmetry
between agency actors and their principals. The model could be translated relatively easily into the criminal enforcement context. State
legislatures could model inspector general acts after the federal
statute, embedding independent inspectors general into prosecutors’
offices and police departments. Those IGs could conduct regular
audits and inspections of law enforcement agents’ compliance with
and reporting on the early-stage decision making criteria discussed
above. (While a few cities and counties already have inspectors
general, those offices lack a key ingredient of the federal model,
namely, the embedding of inspectors general into the very same
agencies they are tasked with overseeing.200)
Illustrative examples from both the local and federal criminal
enforcement context provide a glimpse into how this could work.
Following the decision by the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office to
drop all charges in a sixteen-count indictment against the actor Jussie
Smollett, in connection with Smollett’s having allegedly falsely
reported to the police that he was the victim of a hate crime, a public
uproar ensued, with critics claiming the State’s Attorney had granted
Smollett special, unmerited treatment.201 A judge then appointed a
special prosecutor to determine whether new charges against Smollett
were merited and also whether the State’s Attorney’s Office had acted
improperly in dismissing the initial charges.202
Following an
investigation, the special prosecutor obtained from a grand jury an
indictment charging Smollett with making false police reports.203 The
investigation they had started. See Pranshu Verma & Edward Wong, Another Inspector General
Resigns Amid Questions About Pompeo, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com
/2020/08/05/us/politics/inspector-general-pompeo-state.html [https://perma.cc/378MUGPG].
200 See DANIEL L. FELDMAN & DAVID R. EICHENTHAL, THE ART OF THE WATCHDOG:
FIGHTING FRAUD, WASTE, ABUSE, AND CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT 185–89 (2013)
(“relatively few local governments have a separate IG,” observing that some local agencies
have internal departments that serve “IG functions,” but lack independence from the
agency).
201 Michael Tarm, Smollett Case Could Undermine Prosecutor’s Reform Efforts, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Apr. 23, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/a6afc4cd5f8344e2b7d0d7c15a8f2f15
[https://perma.cc/W7NT-X25U].
202 See Information Release, Special Prosecutor Dan K. Webb of Winston & Strawn
Concludes Investigation into the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office and Chicago Police
Department’s Handling of the Jussie Smollett Case (Aug. 17, 2020), https://news.wttw.com
/sites/default/files/article/file-attachments/Winston%20and%20Strawn%208.17.2020
%20Information%20Release%20re%20Special%20Prosecution.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/A747-LSB2].
203 Id.
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special prosecutor also produced a public report concluding that the
State’s Attorney’s Office had abused its discretion and likely violated
professional ethics rules in its decision to dismiss the charges against
Smollett, but did not violate any laws.204
The undertaking was similar to an internal investigation, with
important caveats: first, the special prosecutor was not embedded
within the office, but came from outside it; and second, he had the
power to convene a grand jury to charge Smollett. Both of these
features made the Smollett appointment more controversial, and
ultimately likely less effective, than a pure inspector-general type
model.205 Nevertheless, the core of the exercise—vesting an overseer
with access to both the evidence available to the prosecutor’s office and
the office’s internal decision-making processes—enabled a substantive
review far superior to the sort of speculative, light-on-facts debate that
would otherwise have played out. The State’s Attorney herself, in fact,
had earlier asked the County’s Inspector General to initiate an
investigation into how her office handled the Smollett case.206
An example from the federal context, utilizing the IG model, is
even more instructive. In response to statutory directive,207 the Drug
Enforcement Administration began, in 2001, to track and report its
progress in disrupting and dismantling “priority targets.”208 Those

204 Id.
205 State’s Attorney Foxx’s defenders chafed at the notion that another prosecutor
could effectively overrule her office’s decision, and some sought to oust the judge that
appointed the special prosecutor. See Alice Yin, Megan Crepeau & Gregory Pratt, Judge Who
Appointed Special Prosecutor in Jussie Smollett Case Loses Cook County Democrats’ Backing, CHI.
TRIB. (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.chicagotribune.com/politics/ct-cook-countydemocratic-party-judge-michael-toomin-smollett-foxx-20200914-psrdqrtf7vey3dozlbwkj3
sj5q-story.html [https://perma.cc/268X-4FSZ]. A regular internal ombudsman, rather
than a special prosecutor plucked to oversee and perhaps prosecute a single case, would
have far more buy-in from all stakeholders.
206 Gregory Pratt, Cook County Inspector General to Review Prosecutors’ Handling of Jussie
Smollett Case, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.chicagotribune.com/politics/ct-metkim-foxx-jussie-smollett-20190412-story.html [https://perma.cc/HD5D-UW2K]; Kim Foxx,
Kim Foxx: I Welcome an Outside Review of How We Handled the Jussie Smollett Case, CHI. TRIB.
(Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ct-perspec-kimfoxx-jussie-smollett-20190329-story.html [https://perma.cc/K927-H49K]. The Inspector
General’s Office appears to have coordinated its review with the Special Prosecutor. See
OIIG Statement Concerning the Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the
Smollett Prosecution (Aug. 17, 2020), https://opendocs.cookcountyil.gov/inspectorgeneral/public-statements/OIIG_Statement_-_Smollett_Prosecution_8-17-20.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z53H-A6EM].
207 Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, P.L. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285
(1993).
208 DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT
ADMINISTRATION’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS
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targets were categorized according to relative position in the
trafficking chain. The highest priority targets were “heads of drug or
money laundering organizations, clandestine manufacturers or
producers, and major transporters and distributors,”209 and the second
highest were entities or persons whose drug trafficking or money
laundering activities were considered to have “a significant impact” on
a designated regional area.210 By its own reporting, the DEA was
progressing spectacularly: in the decade since DEA began utilizing the
tracking system and reporting its progress to DOJ overseers and to
Congress, arrests of priority targets increased three-fold, and there
were substantial reported increases in the number of agents working
on priority cases.211
But when the IG for the Department of Justice proactively
inspected the DEA’s use of the priority designation system, it revealed
the emptiness of those reports. Much of the increased agent work was
directed at targets of relatively lesser value, and the criteria field offices
used to categorize targets as “priority” was vague and malleable.212 The
Inspector General’s review thus made visible—to DOJ leadership, Congress, and the public—realities about the DEA’s targeting decisions
that, in the report’s absence, would have been impossible to see.
This last example is illustrative primarily to show the untapped
potential of a robust inspector general model. In fact, investigations
and audits of early-stage decisionmaking and reporting in federal
criminal enforcement could occur far more often.213 That they do not
is perhaps itself evidence of the problem with secrecy and transparency
in criminal procedure: because early-stage enforcement actions and
decisions are invisible, those who might request inspections do not
know enough even to appreciate when they are needed. Indeed, the
ACT (2003); see U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO/GGD-99-108, DRUG CONTROL: DEA’S
STRATEGIES AND OPERATIONS IN THE 1990S, at 78 (1999).
209 See OFF. OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY:
PERFORMANCE REPORTING SYSTEM REPORT 29 (2015).
210 Id.
211 On agent designation, see OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT OF THE DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION’S PERSONNEL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND CASEWORK
29–43 (2011). On arrests, see DEA arrest data obtained pursuant to DEA FOIA request No.
16-00367-F (on file with author).
212 OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 211, at 32–33.
213 For instance, between 2010 and 2018, the DOJ’s Office of Inspector General
produced a single report on federal enforcement of criminal fraud statutes. See OFF. OF
INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S EFFORTS TO ADDRESS
MORTGAGE FRAUD 9–11 (2014). That report, a 2014 audit of the Department’s mortgage
fraud prosecutions, revealed an overall lack of compliance with congressional directives and
Main Justice’s own stated priorities, as well as systematic failure to even track its own
mortgage fraud workload. See id. at i–iii. (All DOJ OIG reports from 1994–2019 are
available at https://oig.justice.gov/reports/all.htm [https://perma.cc/D3DD-4A3M].)
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special prosecutor’s appointment in the Smollett case occurred only
because the State’s Attorney’s Office had dismissed publicly filed
charges.214 To achieve its potential, an inspector general model must
not be merely reactive but also proactive, instituting regular audits and
inspections of the early, private stages of criminal enforcement, even
when nothing appears amiss.
Once we envision this sort of proactive role, the full scope of
possibilities emerges. Take the issue of racial disparities, perhaps the
single most troubling feature of American criminal legal systems, yet
one for which causal mechanisms are still not fully understood.215
Legal challenges to racial disparities in criminal enforcement must
prove those disparities are a product of purposeful racial
discrimination.216 An IG audit, by contrast, seeks not merely to
ascertain the legality of enforcement practices, but also to search for
the sources and causes of disparities, whatever those might be, and
provide recommendations to stem them. A finding that, for instance,
long-utilized and seemingly sensible practices inadvertently lead to
racially disparate outcomes might be a death knell for a legal
challenge;217 but for an IG, it could be a starting point for rethinking
those practices.218
Given the sheer number of jurisdictions and the variation across
them, the feasibility of a massive data collection and compliance
monitoring operation seems daunting. But it could be fairly easily
accomplished by way of federal intervention. Much in the way the
FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting program helped systematize crimereporting data from across thousands of state and local jurisdictions
nearly a century ago, the Department of Justice could accomplish a
similar feat today. Through its spending power, Congress could make
state and local law enforcement funding contingent on data reporting
to a federal department (for instance, the DOJ’s Bureau of Justice
Statistics), which would promulgate detailed reporting criteria so as to
render the data comparable across jurisdictions and usable for
researchers, and would publish the data. Congress could further
allocate additional funding for state and local prosecutors’ offices and
214 See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
215 See discussion at supra notes 131–37 and accompanying text.
216 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
217 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d 976 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (reluctantly
dismissing defendant’s claims of racial discrimination despite raw racial disparities, finding
disparities the result of pre-charging decisions that were not intentionally discriminatory).
(For a more detailed discussion of this case and the court’s reasoning, see supra notes 136–
37.)
218 See HILLIARD, supra note 186, at 128 (observing an inspector general’s inquiry
expands past legality, conceiving government accountability more broadly as “propriety of
action”).
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police departments to establish independent inspectors general;
funding could vary according to office size and caseload, with large,
high-docket offices and departments securing their own team of
dedicated professionals and smaller, lower-docket offices and
departments in a given geographic area sharing a single IG. And of
course, Congress could easily mandate disclosures by federal law
enforcement and increase funding for the Department of Justice’s IG,
enabling more proactive, and prolific, audits and investigations.
It is important to acknowledge the limits of reform. First, like any
oversight mechanism, IGs are not perfect; they are simply the least
imperfect option under the circumstances, and their relative effectiveness will depend on, among other things, their degree of support both
within and outside their agency, as well as the methods used to appoint
them.219 Second, and more fundamentally, changes to secrecy and
transparency in criminal procedure will not alone make criminal
enforcement fully accountable. True accountability exists only when
there are consequences for acting against the public interest—either
electorally or through sanctions imposed by courts or other
overseers.220 Yet, by leveling the informational deficit of voters and
overseers, these reforms create an environment in which
accountability can transpire. Jeremy Bentham’s description of the
importance of public trials has equal purchase for the earlier stages of
the criminal process: “[w]ithout publicity, all other checks are
insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all other checks are of small
account.”221
CONCLUSION
The boundary between what criminal procedure keeps secret and
what it opens to public view is not adjunct to criminal enforcement; in
many ways, it defines it. Enforcement dynamics take shape as they do
in part because of how much, or little, the public sees of them.
Today’s boundary between secrecy and transparency reflects
historical rather than current enforcement dynamics. Where once
219 See Kempf & Cabrera, supra note 198 (discussing importance of two-branch
appointment process, along with executive branch priorities and resource allocation).
220 Jonathan Fox distinguishes between “two dimensions of accountability: on the one
hand, the capacity or the right to demand answers ( . . . ‘answerability’) and, on the other
hand, the capacity to sanction.” Fox, supra note 164, at 665. Answerability, says Fox, is a
form of “soft accountability,” while “hard accountability” would “involve going beyond the
limits of transparency and dealing with both the nature of the governing regime and civil
society’s capacity to encourage the institutions of public accountability to do their job.” Id.
at 668–69.
221 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524 (London, Hunt &
Clarke 1827).
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public court processes effectively cured overreach and abuse by private
prosecutors, today those public processes do little to constrain the
spaces where enforcement power now resides: in the decisions to
investigate, to charge, or to decline charges. The boundary criminal
procedure sets today enlarges enforcers’ power while reducing
accountability, and inhibits evidence-based assessment and evaluation
of the criminal process.
Redrawing the boundary requires sustained attention to two key
points. First, calibration. Some secrecy in the criminal process is
necessary to ensure the presumption of innocence and the integrity of
the investigative process; but that secrecy must be precisely targeted so
as not to shield enforcers from accountability. Second, scope. To
generate accountability, transparency must encompass outcomes as
opposed to just outputs, and rationales more than processes. These
points counsel in favor of strengthening secrecy rules in some contexts
while relaxing them in others, and ensuring robust compliance with
those rules through an internal-yet-independent inspector general
model.
These reforms will not themselves make enforcers accountable;
ultimate accountability is left to the political process. But if that
process is to mean anything, it must allow its participants and
contributors—legislators, policymakers, researchers, the press and
above all, voters—information, and the tools to evaluate it.

Judges, attorneys,
interpreters, people
transcribing for the deaf, law
enforcement officers, court
clerks, and typists all bound
to the same rule as grand
jurors.
ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 6(l)(1)

“A person commits unlawful grand jury disclosure if the person knowingly discloses to another the nature
or substance of any grand jury testimony or any decision, result or other matter attending a grand jury
proceeding, except in the proper discharge of official duties, at the discretion of the prosecutor to inform
a victim of the status of the case or when permitted by the court in furtherance of justice.”
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2812(A) (2021)

Bound to secrecy. May
only disclose information
when directed by the
Court preliminary to or in
conjunction with a judicial
or administrative
proceeding.
ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 6(l)(1)

Arizona

N/A

Court Reporters and
Stenographers bound to
secrecy.
ALA. CODE § 12-16-215 (2021)

Prosecutor may disclose
information, other than
deliberations and votes, as
needed in the
performance of his or her
duties.
ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 6(l)(1)

Bound to secrecy.
ALA. CODE § 12-16-215
(2021)

Other

Alaska

Bound to
secrecy.
ALA. CODE
§ 12-16-215
(2021)

Grand Jurors

Prosecutes may disclose
certain information in
particular circumstances.
ALA. CODE §§ 12-16-220,
12-16-221 (2021)

Witnesses

Alabama

Prosecutors
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N/A

N/A

“All persons associated
with a grand jury . . .
should at all times be
aware that . . . the
proceedings of which
shall be secret.”
COLO. R. CRIM. P. 6.2(a)

Arkansas

California

Colorado

Prosecutors

Bound to secrecy.
COLO. R. CRIM. P. 6.3

N/A

N/A

Witnesses

“All persons associated
with a grand jury . . .
should at all times be
aware that . . . the
proceedings of which
shall be secret.”
COLO. R. CRIM. P. 6.2(a)

Bound to secrecy.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 924.2
(West 2021)

Bound to secrecy except
when required to testify
re: evidence or for
witness impeachment.
ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 16-85-514 (2021)

Grand Jurors

“All persons associated
with a grand jury . . .
should at all times be
aware that . . . the
proceedings of which
shall be secret.”
COLO. R. CRIM. P. 6.2(a)

Counsel to witnesses
bound to secrecy.
COLO. R. CRIM. P. 6.2(b)

Interpreter appointed to
assist a grand juror
likewise bound to
secrecy.
CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 924.1(b) (West 2021)

N/A

Other
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Witnesses

Grand Jurors
Other

Bound to secrecy.
DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM.
P. 6(e)(2)

Bound to secrecy.
D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM.
P. 6(e)(2)

Bound to secrecy.
FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 905.27(1) (West 2021)

D.C.

Florida
Bound to secrecy—
any “person
appearing before the
grand jury.”
FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 905.27(1) (West
2021)

N/A

N/A

Bound to secrecy.
FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 905.10, 905.24,
905.26, 905.27 (West
2021)

Bound to secrecy.
D.C. SUPER. CT. R.
CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)

Bound to secrecy.
DEL. SUPER. CT. R.
CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)

A reporter, stenographer,
interpreter, or any other
person appearing before
the grand jury—bound to
secrecy.
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 905.24,
905.26, 905.27(1) (West 2021)

Interpreter, court reporter,
operator of recording device,
typist—bound to secrecy.
D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P.
6(e)(2)

Interpreter, stenographer,
operator of a recording device,
typist—bound to secrecy.
DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P.
6(e)(2)

Grand jury no longer required for indictment—only requires a probable cause hearing.
CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 8

Delaware

Connecticut

Prosecutors
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N/A

Bound to secrecy
725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/112-6

Bound to secrecy.
Bound to secrecy.
IND. CODE. ANN.
IND. CODE. ANN.
§ 35-34-2-4(i) (West 2021) § 35-34-2-4(i)
(West 2021)

Idaho

Illinois

Indiana

N/A

N/A

N/A

Bound to secrecy.
HAW. R. PENAL P. 6(e)(1)

Hawaii

N/A

N/A

Witnesses

Georgia

Prosecutors

Bound to secrecy.
IND. CODE. ANN.
§ 35-34-2-4(i) (West 2021)

Bound to secrecy
725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/112-6

Bound to secrecy.
IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 19-1112 (2021)

Bound to secrecy.
HAW. R. PENAL P. 6(e)(1)

Bound to secrecy.
GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-67
(2021)

Grand Jurors

“[N]o person present during
a grand jury proceeding” may
disclose the substance of
testimony.
IND. CODE. ANN.
§ 35-34-2-4(i) (West 2021)

N/A

N/A

Interpreter, reporter or
operator of a recording
device, or any typist who
transcribes recorded
testimony—bound to secrecy.
HAW. R. PENAL P. 6(e)(1)

Court reporter bound to
secrecy.
GA. CODE ANN.
§ 15-12-83 (2021)

Other
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N/A

Bound to secrecy.
KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-3012(b) (2019)

Bound to secrecy.
KY. R. CRIM. P. 5.24(1)

Bound to secrecy.
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 434 (2021)

Iowa

Kansas

Kentucky

Louisiana

Prosecutors

Bound to secrecy.
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 434 (2021)

Bound to secrecy.
KY. R. CRIM. P. 5.24(1)

N/A

N/A

Witnesses

Bound to secrecy.
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 434 (2021)

Bound to secrecy.
KY. R. CRIM. P. 5.24(1)

Bound to secrecy.
KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-3012(b) (2019)

Bound to secrecy.
IOWA R. CRIM. P.
2.3(4)(d)

Grand Jurors

All people present, and all
people with “confidential
access to information
concerning grand jury
proceedings,” bound to
secrecy.
LA. CODE CRIM PROC. ANN.
art. 434 (2021)

All people present bound
to secrecy.
KY. R. CRIM. P. 5.24(1)

Interpreters, attorneys,
reporters, and typists bound
to secrecy.
KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-3012(b) (2019)

Clerk, assistant clerk, bailiff,
and court attendant bound
to secrecy.
IOWA R. CRIM. P. 2.3(4)(c)

Other
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Bound to secrecy.
ME. R. CRIM P. 6(e)

Not explicitly covered,
but the “[p]rohibited
[a]cts; [p]enalties”
subtitle of the Code
states, “A person may not
disclose any content of a
grand jury proceeding.”
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 8-507(a)
(West 2021)

Maine

Maryland

Prosecutors

Not explicitly covered,
but the “[p]rohibited
[a]cts; [p]enalties”
subtitle of the Code
states, “A person may not
disclose any content of a
grand jury proceeding.”
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 8-507(a)
(West 2021)

N/A

Witnesses

Bound to secrecy.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 8-415 (West
2021)

Bound to secrecy.
ME. R. CRIM P. 6(e)

Grand Jurors

Bailiffs, clerks, court
reporters, interpreters
bound to secrecy.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 8-415 (West
2021)

“[S]ecurity officer,
interpreter, translator,
court reporter, operator
of electronic recording
equipment, or any
person to whom
disclosure is made under
this Rule”—bound to
secrecy.
ME. R. CRIM P. 6(e)

Other
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Witnesses
Unsure—“A person
performing an official
function in relation to
the grand jury”
MASS. R. CRIM. P. 5(d)
Bound to secrecy.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 767.19f(1) (West
2021)
Bound to secrecy.
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 18.07

N/A

N/A

Prosecutors

Bound to secrecy.
MASS. R. CRIM. P. 5(d)

Bound to secrecy.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 767.19f(1) (West
2021)

Bound to secrecy.
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 18.07

Bound to secrecy.
MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 13-7-29(1) (2021)

N/A

Massachusetts

Michigan

Minnesota

Mississippi

Missouri

Interpreters and anyone to
whom a disclosure is made
under the section—bound
to secrecy.
MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 13-7-29(1) (2021)
Stenographers and
interpreters—bound to
secrecy.
MO. REV. STAT.
§ 56.190; 540.150 (2021)
Bound to secrecy.
MO. REV. STAT. § 540.320
(2021)

Interpreters bound to
secrecy.
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 18.07

“[A] person” shall not
disclose grand jury content
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 767.19f(1) (West 2021)

“A person performing an
official function in relation
to the grand jury”
MASS. R. CRIM. P. 5(d)

Other

Bound to secrecy.
MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 13-7-29(1) (2021)

Bound to secrecy.
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 18.07

Bound to secrecy.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 767.19f(1) (West 2021)

Bound to secrecy.
MASS. R. CRIM. P. 5(d)

Grand Jurors
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N/A

Bound to secrecy.
NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 172.245 (2021)

Nebraska

Nevada

New Hampshire Bound to secrecy.
N.H. R. CRIM. P. 8(b)(6)

Bound to secrecy.
MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 46-11-317 (2021)

Montana

Prosecutors

N/A

Bound to secrecy.
NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 172.245 (2021)

N/A

N/A

Witnesses

Bound to secrecy.
N.H. R. CRIM. P. 8(b)(6)

Bound to secrecy.
NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 172.245 (2021)

Bound to secrecy.
NEB. REV. STAT. 29-1404
(2021)

Bound to secrecy.
MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 46-11-317 (2021)

Grand Jurors

Interpreter,
stenographer, typists—
bound to secrecy.
N.H. R. CRIM. P. 8(b)(6)

Peace officers, clerks,
stenographers,
interpreters, any anyone
else in the grand jury
room—bound to secrecy.
NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 172.245 (2021)

N/A

Interpreters,
stenographers, operators
of recording devices,
typists—bound to
secrecy.
MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 46-11-317 (2021)

Other

1138
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:3

Bound to secrecy.
N.J. CT. R. 3:6-7

“[O]fficers of the court”
bound to secrecy.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-6-6
(2021)

Bound to secrecy.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 190.25 (McKinney 2021)

Bound to secrecy.
N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-623(e) (2021)

Bound to secrecy.
N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 29-10.1-30 (2021)

New Jersey

New Mexico

New York

North
Carolina

North Dakota

Prosecutors

Bound to secrecy.
N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 29-10.1-30 (2021)

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Witnesses

Bound to secrecy.
N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 29-10.1-30 (2021)

Bound to secrecy.
N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-623(e) (2021)

Bound to secrecy.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 190.25 (McKinney
2021)

Bound to secrecy.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-6-6
(2021)

Bound to secrecy.
N.J. CT. R. 3:6-7

Grand Jurors

Interpreter, reporter, public
servant—bound to secrecy
N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 29-10.1-30 (2021)

“[A]ll persons present”
other than a witness—bound
to secrecy
N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-623(e) (2021)

All others permitted to be
present—bound to secrecy
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 190.25 (McKinney 2021)

“[O]thers assigned to assist
the grand jury”
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-6-6
(2021)

“[A]ll persons other than
witnesses”
N.J. CT. R. 3:6-7

Other
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Bound to secrecy.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 355
(2021)

N/A

Bound to secrecy.
PA. R. CRIM. P. 556.10

Oklahoma

Oregon

Pennsylvania
N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Witnesses

“No person may disclose”
PA. R. CRIM. P. 556.10

N/A

Interpreter,
stenographer, operator
of recording device,
typist—bound to secrecy
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 355
(2021)

Interpreter, court
reporter, typist—bound
to secrecy
OHIO R. CRIM. P. 6(E)

Other

Bound to secrecy.
Interpreter,
R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. stenographer, operator
6(e)(2)
of recording device,
typist—bound to secrecy
R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P.
6(e)(2)

Bound to secrecy.
PA. R. CRIM. P. 556.10

Bound to secrecy.
OR. REV. STAT. § 132.060
(2021)

Bound to secrecy.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 355
(2021)

Bound to secrecy.
OHIO R. CRIM. P. 6(E)

Grand Jurors
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Rhode Island Bound to secrecy.
N/A
R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P.
6(e)(2)

Bound to secrecy.
OHIO R. CRIM. P. 6(E)

Ohio

Prosecutors
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Bound to secrecy.
S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 14-7-1720(A) (2021)

Bound to secrecy.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 23A-5-16 (2021)

N/A

Bound to secrecy.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 20.02 (West
2021)

N/A

South Carolina

South Dakota

Tennessee

Texas

Utah

Prosecutors

N/A

N/A

N/A

Bound to secrecy.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 23A-5-16 (2021)

N/A

Witnesses

Bound to secrecy.
UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 77-10a-9 (West 2021)

Bound to secrecy.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 20.02 (West
2021)

Bound to secrecy.
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 6(k)

Bound to secrecy.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 23A-5-16 (2021)

Bound to secrecy.
S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 14-7-1720(A) (2021)

Grand Jurors

N/A

Bailiff, interpreter,
stenographer, person
operating a recording
device, typist—bound to
secrecy
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 20.02 (West 2021)

N/A

Interpreter, stenographer,
operator of recording
device, typist—bound to
secrecy
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 23A-5-16 (2021)

Interpreter, court
reporter—bound to
secrecy.
S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 14-7-1720(A) (2021)

Other
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Bound to secrecy.
VT. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)

Bound to secrecy.
VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-192 (2021)

Bound to secrecy.
WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.27.090 (2021)

Vermont

Virginia

Washington

Prosecutors

Bound to secrecy.
WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.27.090 (2021)

N/A

N/A

Witnesses

Bound to secrecy.
WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.27.090 (2021)

Bound to secrecy.
VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-192 (2021)

Bound to secrecy.
VT. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)

Grand Jurors

Private attorney, city
attorney, corporation
counsel, reporter,
interpreter, public
servant, principal, and
“other person”—bound
to secrecy.
WASH. REV. CODE
§ 10.27.090 (2021)

Special counsel, sworn
investigator—bound to
secrecy.
VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-192 (2021)

Interpreter, court
reporter, operator of
recording device, typist,
court security officer—
bound to secrecy.
VT. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)

Other
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Bound to secrecy.
W. VA. R. CRIM. P.
6(e)(2)

N/A

Bound to secrecy.
WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 7-5-208 (2021)

West Virginia

Wisconsin

Wyoming

Prosecutors

N/A

N/A

N/A

Witnesses

Other

Bound to secrecy.
WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 7-5-208 (2021)

Bound to secrecy.
WIS. STAT.
§ 968.41 (2021)

Interpreter,
stenographer, operator
of recording device,
typist—bound to secrecy.
WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 7-5-208 (2021)

Reporter bound to
secrecy.
WIS. STAT.
§ 968.43 (2021)

Bound to secrecy.
Interpreter,
W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2) stenographer, operator
of recording device,
typist—bound to secrecy
W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)

Grand Jurors
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